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With the ending of the Cold War in Europe decreasing the tensions between East 
and West, the Unjtcd States-Japan security relationship developed after World War 
II has comc under conti nuous reexamination. In order to rectify possible 
misperceptions as to U.S resolve for this all iance in the Pacific, the Departmcnt of 
Defense has currently initi ated the U.S.-Japan Security Dialogue . Although the 
Unjted States and Japan security relationsh ip has a long history throughout the Cord 
War, it is the recent changes in the strategic environment in :'>Jortheast Asia and the 
world whi ch prompts a reassessmcnt of Japan's own role . The issues that now 
intluence Japan in its reassessment of its desired international role also infl uence its 
pe rspective towards its security relationship with the United States . The constrai nts 
placed upon Japan by its history of anti-military policies , domestic budgetary 
problems and present political alignment do not allow it enough freedom to take a 
hardlinc in negot iations with the United Stales. 
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The ending of the Cold \Var caused a dramatic change in the strategic 
aligmnent of tne world due to the sudden breal.:up of the Soviet Union. As East-West 
tensions Sllbsided, nations became less fearful of the outbreak of a global nuclear war 
and focused their efforts away fimn international politics and towards more domestic 
I con cems. Realist theory precludes that alliances form to balance power against a 
threat. In the absence of any credible threat to Westem niltions, the U.S.-Japan 
securi ty alliance suddenly came under close sCl1ltiny as to its relevance Ul this new 
Caused by lising concerns that the U.S. interest in its security agreements with 
Japan were quickly decreasing, the Depmtment of Defense initiated discussions 
<li med at reaffinnlng the seclllity relation ship between the two nations. The U.S.-
Ja pan Security Dialogue, as it is now called, was undertaken to reexamine the 
rciationsh.ip ill all its bilateral, regional (Iud global aspects. The United States hoped 
that by separating all pending issues into these distinct categories, they could faci\ilate 
concun'ence and agreement between the two nations. 
In order to better understand Japan's initial position in this dial ogue, an 
investigation into its past national seclIlity policies and agreements with the United 
States is required . Since tne ending of hostilities in 1945, the most important issue 
to Japan was the preservation of its "national essence." Through agreements wi th the 
United States, Japan was able to guarantee it~ own secwity through lllinunal effort on 
its own pan. In Oldcr to prevent itselffi'om bccoming a mili tary pawn simi lar to U.S . 
all ies in Europe, lallan erected anti-military policies to hold American ambitions at 
an ns le ngth whil e appeasing the Japanese publ ic. Following Japan's economic 
miracle of the 1960s and 1970s, Japan began to increase its mili tary capability an d 
bring it d oser in line with its economic prowess 
Although the breakup of the Soviet Union relaxed tensions throughout the 
xiiI 
world, Northeast Asia, although n:duced, still nlllintains a high level ofthreal towards 
Japan. With two of its four neighbors being nuclear powers and a third, the 
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPI{K), being a probable nuclear power, 
.Tapllil exists in one of the most potentially dangerous regions of the world. Although 
Russia's military budget has been succnmbing to the economic problems which have 
devastated its countly, the level of mititmy muscle it possesses in the Far East is still 
significant. While most leaders believe that the U1lification of Korea is inevitable, 
Japan still obselves the 'cold war' persisting on the peninsula with anxiety. The future 
of China, however, remains to be the largest question posed by world leaders. With 
all the estimates ofChlna's economic boom continuing OIl into the 21st century, the 
conesponding modernization of its military greatly distTesses Japllil. 
\Vith its strategic concerns changing in the post Cold War, Japan has been 
reassessing it role in the new interoational system. The ending of the Cold Voiar, the 
lccent recession and tJu: removal of the Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) from sole 
control ofthe govenunent have all assisted in decreasing Japan's military spending 
below expected levels. Based on the present public and political mood, Japan is not 
prepared to undertake the social and fiscal costs associated with unilateral 
reammtllent 
rhe best means for Japan to increase its international role and prestige is 
through participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Based on 
the long time in which it took the Diet to reach a consensus on guidelines for 
participation in I'KO, it is not likely that any other relaxation of military restraints 
will soon be forthcoming. 
In SllppOlt of the U.S.-Japan Dialogue, the United States has recently released 
numerous documents referring to tJle strategic significance of Japan and U.S. resolve 
for continued maintenance of ule alliance . \\'nile a general consensus on global and 
regional issue was already met, bilateral issues appear to occupy most of the 
discllssions 
Without unilateral rearmament or a viahle suhstitutc CO! the United States in 
the cards, Japan's best option IS to accept the U.S. overall precept ofiJlcn::asing its 
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1. INTROULJCnON 
\\'ith the eliding of the Cold \Var in Europe detAeasing the tensions between East and 
West, the United States-Jap~n security relatiunship developed after Wurld \\'ar n has come 
Ullder I.:ontinuous reexamination In the past two years relations between the two nations 
11ave been strained by disagrecmcnts on sccurity, tradc and economic issues. \\'ith seo;;urity 
llIatters temporarily being pushed to the back burner by economic considerations, the U S 
Defense and State Departments have undertaken a policy initiative to reappraise security ties 
with Japan. In the absence of the evil empire, So\-iet Union, many Japanese began to 
question the usefiilness of the Mutual Security and Couperation Treaty ('v1SCT) with the 
Cnited States They call for Japan to seek a larger political role in the international 
community whic:h would more accurately reflect its total power and responsibilities 
On the American side, the Deparlment ufDefense came to the opinion that in order 
to perpetuate L.S. leadetshlp in Northeast Asia, a strong and viable security arrangement 
\\~th Japan would be necessar)' to accord the )Jational Security Strategy of Fngagemcnt and 
Enlargement The hackbone ufthe existing leadership role rested firmly on the U S ability 
to maintain military forces in the region, It was the forward deployment of troops in Japan 
and the use of the bases by the mutual security agreements, that allowt:d the United States to 
carry out its Cold War strategy uf contairunent 
To bring U,S strategy up to date, the "Nye Init iative" was undertaken to recxamint: 
the relationship between the US_ and Japan in all its bilateral, regional and global aspects_ To 
be most effective, this agonizing reappraisal mllst not be a mere h,mgover of t.he Cold V.'ar, 
but must look forv.'<U'd to the forlllulation of future strategies and goals of both natiuns_ The 
United States mus!. not attempt to follow its old habits and force its agenda upon Japan as it 
has lor the last half century By being more considerate of Japan's own strategy in Asia, the 
Caited States will bl' able to taster a lesser degree of patron/client relationship for the future 
This tht:sis will primarily focus on the appropriate roles for the United States and Japan to 
play, The security relationship is an essential part of the overall three legged (security, 
dipl omal:Y and economic) relationship with Japan 
In d(.1ermining Japan's future strategy, an analysis of its past policies concerning the 
security relationship with the United States will be examined. It will be found that after 
World War H, these policies followed distinct trends and patterns which coincided with the 
presence of the Cold War. It was the strategic environment emerging from the end of the 
Cold War that caused Japan to reassess its global role ami inspircd the United States to 
undertake its own policy initiative 
In conclusion this thesis will examine the reappraisal of strategy in the United States 
and its reassessment in Japan . We examine the political economic and military factors 
operating within eaeh country as they influence ongoing diplomatic processes. The most 
plau~ibl e ~cenarios for the future will be ~uggesred with appropriate recommendation s for the 
most effective relationship 
ll. J Al'ANESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES: 1945 TO 1990 
The rise of Japanese militarism and its subsequent fo reign and military policies leading 
up to the commencement of World War IT has been extensivdy covered by academics and 
scholars Although covered j uSt as extensively. Japan's polices since its capitulation to the 
UniIeci State" in 1945 have not been as wmprehensive and single strategy minded as those 
before 
In the wntext of the United States-Japan Security relationship, this chapter shows 
the evolution of Japanese policies from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War 
Particular attention will be paid to those policies, whether influcn-.:ed by the US _ or 
domestically generated, that have had a direct impact on the security/cooperation agreement 
that exists today. Japan's defense policies since the end of World War n have been separated 
into five categories in order to better demonstrate Japan's overall strategy_ Although not all 
policies fall neatly into these five categories, the following outline, table (I), is provided to 
illustrate the general trends which have ex.isted 
,fallan's Defcns(". Policirs: 1945 to 199U 
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A. SACRIFICING SOVEREIGNTY "-OR SURVIVAL 
On 2 September 1915, the Japanese government agreed to an "unconditional" 
sun-cnder at the hands of the Uni ted States representing the allied powers. The surrendn 
ended Japan's Greater East Asia War and commenced a pcriod of demilitarization and 
democratization overseen by the US_ occupation forces To the Japanese leaders who 
k-rminated the \var. the most impOltant issut> was prt>serving Kokulai or the "national essence" 
of Japan' This being the case Japan appeased the occupying force which insisted on t.he 
destruction of all remaining military hardware and abolishment of the Anny and Navy 
ministries, bringing Japan to a grollnd ;tero position concerning defense_ The Japanese, who 
witnesscd the division of Germany and Korea, were willing to socrifice many areas of 
sovereignty to ensure the conlimled existence ofJapan as a single nation 
On J May 1947, the new Japanese constitution drailed primarily by General 
MaeArthur"s staff, was enacted" The most controversial provision of this Constitution was 
Article 9, the "No War" clause, which follows 
!1..spiring siocerely t.o an inlemat.ional peace ba~ed on Justice and order 
In conjunction \vith the abolishment of the Shinto State (the emperor centered 
government), the newly established bicameral government was to be free of military cabinet 
with the Brake on !vlihtary Expansion, " Japan 
CO/HI"} Study (Washlllgton D_C ; CS Governrn~n t 
l A.nicle 9 ofJapane~e Constitution 
members ' This placed Japan's security and subsequently its military under civilian control 
for thlt first time. This appeasltment by the Japanese towards their occupiers was necessary 
to assure the quick revitali7.ation of a dcvastated country and eventual return of self-
government to Japan 
At the time of its inception, these anti-militarist policies were lookd upon very 
favombly by the international community For the United States, however, this Ituphoric 
feeling did not last long as Article') later became a thorn in America's side during talks to 
reann Japan 
B. WESTERN AFFlLTA TION AND SECURiTY 
Until 1948, the Japanese and U.S. leaders, content with the economic and political 
progress in Japan, were satisfied with the previous Potsdam fonnula set on punishing Japan 
Afler the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the allied powers sought to officially conclude a 
peace treaty. This nonnalization of relations between Japan and thlt rest of the international 
community would be the first step in reinstating full sovereignty back to Japan. The lreaty 
of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, 14 February 1950, between the Peoples 
Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), amplified the 
rise Conununism and the influence of the cold war in Asia. As the Cold War began taking 
shape the United States considering building a regional defl.'Ilse alliance in Asia similar to 
NATO. Tn wishing to maintain a distinctive cultural identity for Japan, Prime r-.1inister 
Shigcca Yoshida ingeniously used the constitution to rcject any all iance with other Asian 
nations l 
4AnicJe 66 of Japanese Constitution 
'Thlt United States envisioned this military alliance including Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines and perhaps Indonesia. It was hoped that such an allianclt would 
maintain control OVItT the remilitarization of Japan similar to approach taken with Gltrmany 
in Europe. See Ken n. Pyle, The Japanese Question:p(ft>'er and Purpose in a New Era, 
(Washington American Enterprise Institute [AEI], 1992) 23-24 
These externalities influenced Yoshida to be more receptive to U.S. pressure for 
rearmament and a security agreement. Yoshida used the U.S. desires for Japan's st rategic 
location to ohtain a militarily neutral role for Japan. By agreeing to Us. military bases, 
Yoshida achieved security for Japan at no economic cos1.6 This policy of making economic 
rehabilitation and industrial prodw.1ion a national goal, while remaining internationally neutral 
and unamled under the protection of a u.s. security umbrella, later became known as the 
"Yoshida Doctrine.,,7 
The fact that Japan would not rearm itself, made the U.S. task of selling a non· 
pu ni ti ve peace settlement to the other allied signatories easier. The Treaty of Peace with 
Japan which concluded on 8 September 1951 and brought about the official end to the W ar 
in the Pacific, WlIS followed the same day by a security agreement between the United Stales 
and Japan i The Us.-Japan Security treaty which was basically a continuation of the 
"During the peace treaty negotiations Yoshida agreed that Japan would raise an 
addi tional 50,000 man force for defense This was to be separate ITom the 75,000 National 
Police Reserve which was originally organized as the nucleus oflhc filturc Japanese army 
This apparently token agreement of rearmament was necessary to postpone pressure for 
the 300,000 man force being asked for by the US. delegation leaders, John F. Dulles and 
John M. Allison Source. Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the 
remaking oj Jap(m, 1945-1952, (Kent Kent State, 1989) 257-258 
7This grand strategy of allowing continued U.S. military presence in exchange for 
security assurances is clearly discussed by KelUieth B. Pyle in The Japanese Question: Power 
and Purpose ill a New Era. The title Yoshida Doctrine, although never officially named or 
articulated as sllch. was given to this strategy decades after its inception by political leaders 
SAt the San Francisco War Me1l\0rial Opera House, the United State~ hosted the 
~Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan" also called 
the "San Francisco Peace Treaty" The Soviet Union and its satellite countries, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia, attempted to disnlfll the proceedings by proposing amcndmcnts to the draft 
and raising the i~slle of the absence of China. With the existence of two Chinese 
goverrunentS, the Peoples Republ ic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), the 
United States desired to avoid the international quagmire by not inviting either party. The 
Peace Treaty became effective after ratification on April 28, J952. Source: Shigeru Yoshida, 
77le Yoshida Memoirs: 77w Story of Japan In Crisis (Cambridge: Riverside, 1962) 255 
occupation of Japan by U.S. forces, was accepted by Yoshida in order to ensure the 
continuation of Ilis neomercantile strategy 
As Japan benefited economically from the Korean War by fu lfilling many U.S 
procurement requiremt..'1lts. Yoshida oontinued to fend 01T calls by the Cnited States to rearm 
By 1952, Japan and the United State~ began fonnalizing their security relationship. The 
Mutual Security Assistance Pact of 1952, wllich paved the way for U.S, military weapon~, 
equipment, supplies and training, was used to coerce Japan into taking a larger military role,9 
On 15 October 1952, Japan reorganized the National Police Reserve, created in 1950, into 
the National Security Force, supposedly indicating a greater commitment to its own defense. 
C. GREATER COMMITMENT UNDER INCREASED CONSTRAINTS 
Because of Japan's military non-participation in the Korean War, the United States 
wa~ determined to increase Japan's military capability and contribution towards cuntaining 
Communism Shortly after tbe cessation of hostilities on the Korcan peninsula, the United 
States stepped up its pressure on Japan to increase its military capability of the National 
SecUllry Force (NSF), During the Ikeda-Robertson talks of October 1953, Japan did agree 
to gradually increase its self-defense capabilities. With the acceptance of military aid from 
the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 and establislunent 
ufthe Defense Agency, Japan appeared to be taking the necessary steps towards reannament 
This commitment towards a greater role in its own defense led post-war Japan to domestically 
producing its !irst ship and jet aircraft in 1956 
While incrementally succumbing to U.S. pressure, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party 
(LOP) was receiving pressure domestically to not yield to every American desire. The idea 
that Japan was becoming a military pawn of the United States, was continually articulated by 
')The Mutual Security Assistan(.;e Pact, officially named the .Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America, was basically a 
wmpilation of the U,S. Mutual Security Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Set..urity 
Act of 195 1 
the opposition, the Japan Socialist Party (JSp).1fi [n order to quell fears and show that the 
LOP was not simply a puppet of the United States, policies were enacted to specifically 
prevent Japan from hecorning just another division in the US army. The first domestically 
imposed constraint, since Article IX of the constitution, was the Ban on the Overseas 
Dispatch of its military fo rces in 1954.1\ Thi s presented the image that the Japanesc military 
was defending Japan and not US interests, although these intere~ts greatly overlapped each 
other 
The hosting of the fir~t world Conference for the Prevention of Atomic Weapons 
eventually led to a ban on testing in 1954 followed by a subsequent ban on the weapons 
themselvcs in 1958. These policies were influenced by fears that the United States would 
have used atomic weapons in Korea, thus making Japan an accomplice by its support in the 
war effort. It, therefore, seemed that v.ith every increase in its defense, Japan placed counter 
restraints and controls on its military 
In the late 1950s, Japan once again took incremental steps in commitment and 
constraints to alleviate ClUcrnal, U.S .. and internal, opposition party, pressure. The Basic 
Policy for National Defense which was established un 20 May 1957, epitomized the balance 
orthe two competing forces. The Basic Policy which was written with enough vaf,'lleness to 
please both sides, follows 
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect 
aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggres.~ion, thereby preserving the 
independence and peacc of Japan founded upon democratic principles. To 
achieve this obje(;tive, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the 
lOJoseph P. Keddelt Jr., fllC Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Infernal and 
External Prl!-sslI.res, (New York M.ESharpe, 1993) 5 
11 0pposition party pressures grew when in was discovered that Prime Minister 
Yoshida, at the reque~1 or the U.S. , secretly sent minesweepers under the control of the 
Maritime Guard Force to South Korea in October 1950. The mission subsequently 
suffered casualties which increase the domcstic pres~ure against such future deployments 
Source: Keddell, 34 
following principles 
1. T a support the activities of the United Nations, and promote 
international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world 
peace 
2. To promote the public welfare and enhance the people's love for the 
country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security 
3, To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary 
for sel f-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing 
domestic situation 
4 . To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Us.-Japan 
securityarrangt:ments, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations 
in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.12 
The legislating ofthc Basic Policies laid the ground work for the first Defense Buildup 
Plan the next month. It was easier for Diet members to accept the provisions in the buildup 
plan knowing that the forces would only be used for dcfcn~ while overall deterrence was still 
being provided by the United States. The changes in Japan's capability provided by this new 
buildup, led to a conference on revising the security treaty with the United States. The result 
of this conference which commenced October 1958 was the Treaty of Mutual Security and 
Cooperation with the United States, enacted in 1960. The treaty ratification was not 
automatic as its discussion led to the treaty led to the 1960 crisis. lJ 
The treaty was ratified only by a parliamentary stratagem and evoked 
continued opposition from a vocal segment of the population which has been 
able to chL'Ck !Uly extensive military commitments on the Japanese .~ide , The 
treaty became law but the passions it aroused were sufficient to cause the 
ruling party to change leaders." 
'2Dejense of Japan 1994, 63 
13For more on the political issues of the 1960 Crisis see: Frank C Langdon, 
Japan's Foreign Policy, (Vancouver University of British Columbia, 197]) 7-21 and Jon 
Livingston, Joe Monroe and Felicia Oldfather, Postwar Japan: 1945 fo the Present, (New 
York: Random House, 1973) ]07-380 
:4Langdon, 7 
10 
The Treaty of Mutual Se\;urity and Cooperation with the United States replaced the 
previously unequal agreement of lhe U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 r he major 
differcnces fo llow 
• U,S, forces could no longer be used to quell internal riols and di ~turbances 
• the United States no longer has a veto over any thi rd country's rnilitary presence 
in Japan 
• the United States could no longer project military power from bases in Japan 
against a third country without wnsulting Japan concerning the threat to Japan and 
the region 
• recognition of contribution of Japan's anned forces in the defense against an anned 
attackII 
Based on the First Defense Buildup Plan, Japan was to procure defensive forces and 
increase its Ground Self:Defense Force (GSDF) in order to eventually replace U.S forces 
upon their withdrawal By the Third Defense Plan in 1%6, Ihe Defense Agency had begun 
requesting weapon systems with a more offensive character. This led to controversy over the 
procurement goals and the amount of fi nancing required. The Defense Agency came under 
scrut iny for its request of spending greater than two percent of Japan's Gross National 
Product (GNP). The anti-militarists believed that these increases in spending would be used 
to suppon U S, stratef:,'Y in greater East Asia and nOI simply the defense of Japan,lO This was 
the fir st case in which Japan linked dcfense expenditures to its GNP to control reannament 
by arguing that high levels of defense spending are detrimental to economic growth 
Diminishing milital)' aid and increasing U.S involvement in Vietnam, influenced Japan 
to place greater constraints on ils armed forces and defense industry, Prime "Minister Salo's 
slatements in the Diet in April and December of 1967 eonee<ning wms transfers and nuclear 
lIThe entire treaty is located in the Appendix A 
L6Keddell,4 1_43 
II 
weapons, respectively, have become accepted with the same respect as law~ . Later known 
as the Ban on Arms ExportsJ) and the Three Non-nuclear Prineiplcsl1 , these policies were 
directed at Japan taking a international stand on the issues of anns control and nuclear 
proliferation. They also assisted in making Japan appear less aggressive to its neighbors while 
it fOlUld itself once again supporting a military venture by the United States with wruch it did 
not agree whole-heartedly 
As Japan emharked on building a self-sufficient military, one which could fend off an 
invasion without U.S. assistance, President Nixon announced a new U.S, strategy for the 
Pacific, later titled the Nixon Doctrine. It stated that Asian nations would assume more of 
the burden for their own ground defense, while the United States would still supply air and 
naval protection,19 A result of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, this 
doctrine indicated a lack of U,S. commitment to Asia and the South East Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), as the prestigious United State~ was discouraged by the much less 
sophisticated North Vietnam The implications for Japan of this U, S, retrenchment from Asia 
17The three principles on Arms Export declares that anns exports shall not be 
permitted to: I) Communist bloc countries; 2) countries prohibited by the United Nations; 
and 3) countries involved in international conflict 
18The three Non-nuclear Principles ~tated that Japan would not possess, produC{: 
or introduce nuclear weapons into its country 
)·)Dr. Claude A. Buss offers the following analy~is of the Nixon Doctrine: "By way 
of elaboration of the Nixon Doctrine, various spokesmen for the administration explained 
that the United States would remain strong in the Pacific as an encouragement to its 
friends and a deterrent to war, but would no longer immerse itself in the internal affairs of 
others, The United States would support nationalism, economic development and 
modernization in accordance with its interests and commitments. It would not turn its 
back on any nation of the region but would avoid the creation of situations in which there 
might be such dependency on the United States as to enmesh the United States inevitably 
in what were essentially Asian conflicts and problems. The United States wished to 
extend assistance to the greatest extent possible but in an orderly and judicious manner: it 
wished to participate a~ one Pacific nation among scvt.-'Tal in economic development and 
the maintenance of stability in Asia," See Claude A. Buss, The United States and Ihe 
Philippines, (Stanford AEI-HooverPolicy Studies, 1977) 101. 
!2 
was obviou~ 
If the Cnited States took a more passive role towards the relatively 
small weak states, it would probably expet:t considerably more from the 
healthy and more capable ones in Northeast Asia, such as Japan. W 
Prime Minister Sato used the cbange in U S. strategy to ask for the return of Okinawa 
to Japan. Directly following thl;.': November \ 969 summit in Washington, Prime Minister Sato 
and President Nixon released a joint communique agreeing on the return of the Ryukus 
islands to Japan's jurisdiction in 1972 and the subsequent extension ohhe present security 
treaty over Okinawa at that time. The Ryukus were the last remaining territory to be returned 
to Japan following World War Un The Saw-Nixon Communique has been referred to as 
"the high water mark for postwar Japanese-American relations, ,,12 prior to the subsequent 
deterioration of relations in the early 19705 
I). G REATER SELF-RELIANCE RESlJLTING FROM DECREASED U.S. 
COMMITMENT 
As President Nixon set off on his new Asian strategy to open relations with China, 
culminating with his historical trip to Beijing, Japan felt that it was being left. behind and in 
the dark by the United States 
Prime Minister Sato, ta lked about 'self-reliant defense' in order to 
appeal to Japanese nationalist feeling which was impatient and fearful of 
American bases. The phrase had popular appeal and had the merit of 
attracting some support for Japan's defense fo r(;es and government policy. It 
al so relied upon national resentment of American forces and I;.':nforced 
2°Langdon. J 22 
liThe Ryukus and the Bonins islands, previously returned in 1968 were originally 
withheld from Japan as insurance against future aggres~ion or remilitari7.ation following 
World War II. Source Livingston, 232 
2lLivingston, 275 
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involvement in American Asian strate!:,,),:B 
While the debate ovt-"f the wnstitutionality of the Self-dcfcnse forces once again arose, 
the LOP was placing constraints on the military as it attempted to buildup and replace the 
subsequent void left by the U.S. withdrawal, As the United States was withdrawing its tTOOpS 
from Vietnam and Japan, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was allllouncing its new policy 
of "peaceful strength" in hopes of increasing its budget and the overall SilC of the SOP. With 
outside events increasing the opposition's position in thl;': Diee', IDA was forced to come up 
with a compromise buildup plan while still appeasing the JSP. 
On 16 February 1976, Prime Minister Miki announced a new view on anns exports 
to the Diet, The three principles of 1967 were reenforced by this new articulation of the 
policy which added specific definitions to thc types of arms and technology which could not 
be ex.ported. The first National Dcfense Program Outline (NDPO), released in October 1976, 
was an attempt to clearly articulate the end strength goal for the SDF, thcreby decreasing 
attention on the JlJA by the opposition party. With its clear declaration of the posture and 
missions as well as the expected force size of the three branches of the SDF, the i',TIPO had 
bewme the focal point for of all military expenditures and future IDA budgets2l 
In conjunction with the NDPO, the One Percent Ceiling was also adopted in 1976 
This limit on military spending which was not to exceed one per(;ent of Japan's GNP, was an 
indirect result of U.S, pressure for Japan to increase its military spending. With the existance 
ofthe ISDF and its subsequent budgetary requests continually causing heated debates in the 
Diet, the One Percent Ceiling WdS a means of strut-turing military cxpenditures in such a way 
"'Langdon, 120 
14 I )Dc(;reased threat due to end of Victnam War, 2):t:ero economic grmvth caused 
by the oil crisis of 1973, and 3)scandal over Lockheed's aircraft sales to the IDA: all 
reenforced the lSP position lhat defense spcnding should decreased and strictly controlled 
2'The force levels of the NDPO are listed in thc Appendix B. 
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to appease both pro and the anti-mil itary advocates26 
To facilitate achievemem ofNDPO force levels, the government formulated the 1978 
Mid-Tenn Planning Estimate (MTPE), wnich essentially was a five year weapons 
procurement plan The 1978 MTPF. (1980-1'J84) was aimed at making qualitative 
improvements in defense capabilities through education, training, and implementation of 
teclulOlogical advancesu The IDA's goal was to shift the tOClls of defense away £Tom money 
and on to force and equipment capability 
E. EROSlON OF POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS 
As the Reagan Administration took office ;n the early 1980s, the United States 
increased its political pressure on Japan seeking increases in military spending and 
procurement. Public pressure in the United States was partially diiven by the increasing trade 
dcficit with Japan. Even without U.S. pressure, Japan found itself being trapped by its own 
policies. The NUPO and One Percent Ceiling became opposing constraints on Japan's 
Defcnse Budge\. The NDPO called for increases in military equipment in order to meet the 
force levels stated in 1976, yet the One Percent Ceiling placed fiscal constraints on 
p rocurement which would prevent the desired force levels from ever being reached . The 
option of purchasing or producing inferior and outdated equipment to meet the target force 
requirements, would contradict the language of the NDPO which calb for the "consideration 
to qualitative improvements aimed at parity with the teclmical standards of other nations." 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, also increased the US concern for 
burden snaring with its allies. Greater pressure was placed on Japan to pay its fair share for 
'"This policy did not dramatically effect Japan's defense budget since it had 
consistently been below 1% GNP since 1%7. The limitation imposed was more rhetorical 
since Japan's method for accounting its defense expenditures are different from most other 
natiom and therefore not an accurate method of com pans on. Keddell 64-67,82-86 
n KeddeU,69 
is 
the containment of the Soviet Union2~ In May 198 1, during the annual summit, Prime 
Mini~ter SU7uki and President Reagan confirmed the "alliance relationship" hetween the two 
countries as Japan agreed to increase its share of the defense burden 19 This greater 
commitment led Japan to accept responsibi lity for defending the sea lanes out to \000 miles 
in 1982. In 1983, Japan agreed to allow the transfer of defense-related technologies to the 
United States in order to decrease tensions between the nations. JO This agreement eased 
Japan'~ anti-mili tary constraints by making the United States the exception to its 1967 Ban 
on Arms Exports. In addition, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were believed to have 
eroded to the "2.5 Non-Nuclear Principlcs" since critics contended that the Maritime Self-
Detcnse Forces (MSDF) were conducting joint maneuvers with U. S. naval vessels that were 
suspected of carrying nuclear weapons]l 
As the rea1i7ation that the SDF was incapable of meeting the sea lane defense 
commitment, the 1981 MTPE (1983-1987) increased prCK.urement ofaiT and maritime assets 
The procurement schedule placed increasing pressure on the one percent Gh'P ceiling yet 
domestic politics prevented any further action on the matter. Following the July 1986 
election~, which marked the LDP's greatest victory, Prime Minister Nakasone forced the 
2811l 198 1, the U.S. Secretary of Defense was required by Congress to submit an 
alUlUal "allied commitments report" Its purposes was to tract allied progress towards 
meeting the 3 percent spending objective agreed upon in 1977. Lower defense spending 
differentials for allies were believed 10 make their forces less capable. Source: Keddell , 81 
HSee Defense of Japan 1983, Reference 35, Joint communique between Prime 
Minister Zenko Suzuki and President Ronald Reagan, May 8,198 1, p299-300 
JO Japan saw this agreement as reciprocation for the transfer of U .S teclmologies 
during the 1950.'1 and 1960s, which greatly b~ncfittxl Japan's economy. Source: Defense of 
Japan 1983, p2 11-12 
l'Kedddl , 126 
1G 
abandomnent of the one percent ceiling on lanua!)' 27, 1987.11 This stronger cOlluuitment 
to lhe L:nited States was further symbolized three days laler wilh an agreement to assume the 
United States forces Japan (USFJ) expenses on Japanese labor by lune 1987. Tn 1988, the 
US and Japan entered into the codevelopment of the FSX 
While these developments took place in Japan, the appearance of Gorbaehev's 
perestroika and glasnost policies in the SO\iet Union heralded the eventual end of the Cold 
War. A new strategic sctting appeared in Northeast Asia wbich was 10 alter till: entire course 
of US-Japan relations 
JlThe ceiling was eclipsed by using an incremental defense spending increase in thl: 
hudget. The 1985 proposed 1.004 percent expenditure had been postponed to diminish 
controversy prior to the ekction 
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TTL NORTHEAST ASL\ STRATEGle SETTL'iG 
In the past decade. the economic and military growth which occurred in East Asia has 
attracted significant attention to the region. Tn order for the United States to proceed with 
its National SecUlity Strateb'Y of Engagement and Enlargement in Asia, a reevaluation oHhe 
players and policies is required to better prepare the alliance ofthe United States and Japan 
for the 21st century This chapter will address the shifts occccasioned by the end of the Cold 
War in the military and security policies of the countries posing potential threats to stability 
in Northeast Asia This short list consists of Russia, China, and North Korea'! 
Since the end of the Cold War, East Asia has followed a trend of downsizing. As 
Soviet Union forces were dishanded and/or turned over to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, the United States and its allies have also made significant force reductions in the 
region Many have expected to reap the bt.->lJefits which Francis fukayama wrote of in The 
End 0/ History. The United States and Northeru.'t Asia nations however have not been willing 
to believe that the world has become benevolent even though Russia is not perceive to he the 
threat it once was. Since the End of History was written, the Gulf War, Operation Restore 
Hope ill Somalia and the Balkan War have indicated that U,S. resolve and commitment is 
directly proponional to the perception of the economic and strategic importance of the 
regioll.34 There is no question that the United States will strive for continued engagement in 
the region thro ughout the next century 
The strategic situation in Northeast Asia has been one of re lative peace and stability 
ll The Repuhlic of Korea (ROK) is not considered a threat to regional stability due 
10 thc Mu tual Dcfensc Treaty of 1953 and close ties it maintains with the United States 
With South Korea mainly focused on the DPRK, the tensions that st ill exlst between them 
and Japan are at a level not warranting consideration at this time 
HThesc three cases were chosen to exemplity the spectrum of U.S, involvement in 
the post Cold \Var Era. 
19 
since the end of hostilities in the Korean War in 195J,J> The lack of military and political 
action does not indicate that concerns over neighboring military and economic power has 
been absent. Directly influenced by the ending of the cold war and, more recently, the results 
orthe GulfWaL strategic and military thinking in the region has followed two major trends; 
I) offensive military strategies of maneuver arc replacing defensive ones of attrition and 2) 
military acquisitions and force structures arc being altered to concentrate power in smaller, 
more mobile units. 
The regional increase in offensive minded and power projection tact ics and strategies 
is not a 20th century revelation. Sun Tzu discussed the use of maneuver warfdrc centuries 
ago It is the most recent corrununist military successes in Russia (Revolution and World War 
IT) and China (Revolution and Korean Wan) which used overwhelming numbers and attrition 
oftlle enemy that greatly influenced military strategists in these three countries over the last 
four decades, Recent mil itary triumphs and technological advances however. have played a 
large role reversing this train of military thought 
This trend of offensive strategies and tactics will most likely continue until 
engagement of a western power in the next war or major conflict Its subsequent lessons 
learned will then reenforce or contradict the recent lessons of mobility and power projection 
from Desert Storm and the Falkland Islands 
Desmond Ball, in his article "Arms and Aftluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-
Pacific Region," discusses consistency in regional arms-buying programs. The systems that 
have aroused the most interest in the region include 
national command, control and communications systems 
national strategic and tact ical intelligence systems 
multi-role fighter aircraft with maritime attack and air superiority capabilit ies 
maritime surveillance aircraft: 
"The Sino-Soviet border disputes of 1969 are noted as they fina!!y convinced the 
united States that the Sino-Sovier split was for real 
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anti-ship missiles 
modern surface combatants--destroyers, frigates, ocean patrol vessels 
submarines 
electronic warfare systems 
rapid deployment forces 
These acquisitions although showing an emphasis toward naval and maritime forces clearly 
indicate a shift from the wncept of attrition to mobility,)" The renunciation of the old Soviet 
and Chinese doctrines is reenforced by these trends in military procurement 
In conjunction with this pattern, these wuntries have followed the tendency of the 
United States in downsizing their militaries in favor of smaller, more modern units. The 
Japanese Self-Defense Force epitomizes the type of small modern force which is desired in 
the region. Having established the general trends of the region, the following sections will 
address the spccific military tendencies in each country of concern 
A. R USSIA 
\Vith the (-,nd of the cold war, both Japan and the United States have dO\NTIgraderl the 
threat posed by Russia in Northeast Asia. Russia has oftentimes taken on the role of friend 
rather than foe in negotiations with the United States.,7 In the Japanese Defense Agency's 
annual Hlhite Paper (Defense of Japan 1994), the perceived Russian threat has been 
:lODesmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific 
Region." International Security, v 18 n3 (Winter 1993-94) S I 
nOn April 4, 1993 , at Vancouver President Clinton and President Yeltsin declared 
their finn conunitment to a partnership that strenb>thens international stability. Source 
Deparment of Defeme Office of International Security AiTairs, United States Security 
S/ralegy jor Ihe East Asia-Pacific RegiOll, (Washington: US. Government Printing Office 
[GPO], February 1995) 15 
considerably reduced and is placed below that of North Korea3~ The Kurile Island issuc, 
howeveL remains a considerable hurdle for both Russia and Japan to resolve before normal 
relations achieve a higher level. l? 
Before addressing Russia's actual military might in the region, their military stratcgy 
for use of these forces will be dis(;msed. In 1987, the Warsaw Pa(;t under Mkhail 
Gorbachev's leadership, changed its overall military doctrine to a strictly defensive stance 
The So\iet Union then claimed it would never, under any circumstances, begin military action 
against another state ,40 This "New Thinking" in military strategy was inherited by Russia 
upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was not until 1993 that Yeltsin eventually 
reversed this pattern of military thought. Dr. Vladilnir 1. Ivanov, in Asia in the 21s1 Century, 
discussing Russia's new mi litary doctrine, states 
The Russian federation's new ~Ulte emblem is the two-headed eagle--a 
symbol of the duality of its national interests. As a power located 
geographically both in Europe and in Asia, Russia has interests in the West 
and the East. Another view is Ihat the double-headed eagle symbolizes 
Russia's uneasy transition from the past, represented by the Russian Empire 
and Ihe former SO\,iet Union, to the future. Russia's new military doctrine, 
endorsed in November 1993, is a product of these two interpretations. One 
head of the eagle holds flrmJy to Russia's imperial past and the Soviet 
superpower legacy, the other looks for partnership and constn)(;tive 
involvement in world affairs'] 
3!Charles Smith, "Western Front : Defence Strategists Plan for a Post Cold-War 
World," Far East Economic Rel'iew, v157 n30 (July 28, 1994) 16 
39Russia, then thc Soviet Union, never signed the peace agreement ending World 
War II , and is therefore officially still at war with Japan. 
"1-.1ichael M. BoU, "The Revohltion in Soviet/Russian Military Doctrine 1984- 1994," 
Rllssia's New Doctrine: Two Views (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 19(4) I J 
4] Vladimir L Ivanov, "Russia's New Military Doctrine: Implications for Asia," Asia 
in the 21st Century" ~ Erolring Strategic Priorities, (Washington: National Defense 
Univcrsity, 1994) 205 
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This new strategy which seems to revcn ba(;k to the old Soviet mind set, was 
propagated for extemal as much as internal wnsumption Tn conjunction with this doct rinal 
change, the recent use of the phrase near abroad in Russia's foreign affairs is an attempt to 
encompass the fonner Soviet republics into its sphere ofinfJuence, Although internal political 
pressure brought on by the recent nationalist movement may have caused the acceptance of 
this expression and new military doctrine by Yeltsin, it has bcen used as the mandate fo r 
Russian activity inside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS):' 
Although the Soviet Union has been panitioned into thirteen newly independent 
states, Russia has maintained control over most ifnol all of the rnilitary establishment in the 
Far East. The new military doctrine also declares that the Russian military is in a transit ional 
period and ig overall goal is to become smaller and more mobile while establishing a higher 
level ofreadiness ./J This is clearly evident when looking at their military forces in the Pacific 
area, Figures ( 1) through (4) show the quantitative reductions in forces sin(;e 1985. What 
is noteworthy is that most reductions have been made by removing obsolete and older 
equipment from the inventory, With the economic hardship that has struck Russia since its 
opening to the ,"vest, Moscow has made the conscious decision of attempting to maintain the 
latest inventory of weapons while saving money through less operations and training. 
When looking towards East Asia, Russia has made considerable strides in its relations 
with Chin:! while being reluctant to smooth over its old conflicts with Japan. This has lead 
10 ils subsequent "China first" policy. The 1992 Russo-Chinese non-aggression pact/treaty 
states that neither pany will enter into an alliance or allow foreign forces on their soil. The 
reduction oftroop levels shown in figure (1) can he direct ly attributed to the demilitarization 
"IRussian forces in the Tran~caucus region are a clear example of Moscow's 
attempt at establishing irs sphere of influence 
<-'James F. Holcomb, "The Implications of Russia's Military Doctrine," RlIssia',\ 
New Doctrine: Two Views (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994) 6-7 
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of the border with China, 44 This reenforces Russia's decision of placing military and strategic 
concerns before economic prosperity in Asia. It is this bias that sees the Kurilcs as a strategic 
holding for Russian access to the Pacific and not as a tool to nommli:re relations with Japan. 
The sale of26 Su~27 jet fighters, a large number of S300 air-defense missile systems 
and two to four Kilo-class conventional submarines for an estimated $1.8 billion to China 
from Russia has as much to do with buying influence as it does with economics,41 The result, 
however, is an increase in the rift between Russia and Japan as the west perceives these as 
destabilizing transfers, Tf Moscow's main concern was the revitalization of its desolate 
economy, policies which would foster relations with Tokyo, which has the monetary clout to 
assist Russia in this respect, would take precedence over military sales to China. Not being 
the case, Russia is exemplifying the mind set of an old continental power as it places the 
strategic importance of China ahead orthe financial importance ofJapan.46 Russian actions 
lends to the theory that it is seeking a future military alliance with China as it attempts to 
increase its influence through diplomacy and military sales 
Although the threat posed by Russia in Northeast Asia has decreased since 1990, it 
has by no means disappeared. Russia's political moves indicate that it is not willing to accept 
the western system of free market capitalism as its economic and political savior as it once 
did. Although the reliability of its equipment as well as the manning and proficiency levels 
of its forces are questionable at best, the sheer maintenance of forces at such levels as well 
as the present military strategy require that Russia be continued to be assessed as a potential 
future threat to stability in the region 
44Since the break up of the USSR, the conscription system in Russia has been in 
disarray causing many units to be undermanned. This phenomenon may be used as an 
alternate explanation of the reduction of force s in the region 
<ITai Ming Cheung, "China's Buying Spree: Russia Up to Upgrade Peking's 
Weaponry," Far East Economic Review, v lS6 027 (July 8, 1993) 24 
46Stephen J. Blank, Ihe New Russia in the Ne1t, Asia (Carlisle: Strategic Studies 
Insti tute , 1994) 11-24 
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Russian Ground Troop' in the FarEut Russian Jliaval Forces in the Far Ea! t 
Figure I Figure 2 
Runian Air Fo~ (Jo'ighttn) in tbe Far Ead RQs~iaD Air Force (nomber~) in tbe Far Ea.t 
Figure 3 Figure 4 
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.B. CHINA 
China is now economically strong. In the 21st century, China will 
become a threat. In the past, all hig economic powers turned into big military 
powers Southeast Asia is cautious of China's southward 
advancing 
-Japan Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama" 
Recent estimates of double digit growth have placed China in the spotlight as an 
ex.pected economic power in the near future . China's projected gross domestic produce 
(GDP) will easily eclipse Japan's and all others in Asia by 2010.41 "Ibis economic prosperity 
wi1llikely increase China's assertiveness and lessen its cooperation with its neighbors, thus 
leading to greater instahility in the region. The effects of economic development on China's 
foreign policy is uncertain. While many hope it will foster more benevolent policies, realist 
thinking suggests that policies resembling realpolitik will be in China's future as it attempts 
to increase its influence proportionate to its economic and military power.49 
In 19R5 when Deng Xiaoping declared that there was no longer a threat ofa large 
scale war in China's near future, the Peoples Liberation Anny (PLA) modified its military 
thinking to accompany this new paradigm. Without the requirement to maintain large forces 
lor an approaching war, a long tcrm strategic vision placing emphasis on modernization was 
41"Japan's Choices __ 50 Years after thc End of World War 11: Cold Peace (Part 5) 
Logic of Redefining Security Arrangement: Overshadowed by Military Power Buildup and 
Economic Growth: 'China Threat Agmment' Rising without Seeing Actual Conditions," 
Mainichi, 15 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, Amt--r1can Embassy, Tokyo, 
25-27 March 1995) 7-8 
41 DelUlY Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon?: China's Threat to East Asian Security," 
internatiollal Security, v 19 nl (Summer 1994) 149- 150 
49China's foreign policies over the past 50 years exemplifies realpolitik at its best, 
as it has continucd to use its position in the international system to it s fullest potential. See 
Roy, 15 7 
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adopted. ~ China's "Strategic turning point in ideas governing the buildup of the Armed 
Forces" sets the goal of becoming the world's premier military force by 2050 51 
Since 1984 the PLA has steadily decreased its manning from 4,000,000 to 2,930,000 
in 1994. With the demilitarizing of the border and normalization ofrclations with Russia to 
include the non-aggression pact, China has been free to reduce its manning requirements 
These reductions indicate nO! only a lessening of hostilities in the region toward China but 
also a redirecting of resources away from marming and towards modernization or its anTIed 
fo rces 
China's military expcnditurcs which decreased during the 1980s, have increased 
dramatically in the past three years, caluTIlniating with a twenty five percent increase in 1994 
The tnJC figures for expenditures arc four to five times higher sim:e resean.:h and development 
as well as pensions arc not included In addition, the profits generated by the armed forces 
economic endeavors arc also not accounted for in the otlicial budget. It is estimated that 
China's mili tary owns lip to 20,000 companies with their profit heing funneled back into the 
PLA's budget \2 China's military can grow at an explosive fate virtually undetected because 
of this arrangement 
The Gu[fWarwas responsible for China reevaluating its military thinking which had 
always emphasized the importance of men (people's war) over machine. Much of Iraq's 
inadequate weaponry i!lcluding twenty percent of its tanks, had been supplied by China with 
the rest of the hardware being superior to that in China's inventory This was the principal 
impetus for China's $1.8 billion arms purchase from Russia which induded 5U-27s, 5-300s 
and Kilo submarines. Arms purchases from Russia have increased steadily over the past few 
years to an estimated $5 billion in 1994. Recently, C1rina has aggressively pursued the 
,uYalcntin Sttishlcvskiy, "China's Defense Policy: Redefining Security Interests & 
Rewriting Military Doctrines," Asian Defense J01lrnal (February 1995) 30-31. 
\IShishievskiy, 11. 
)2"China's New Modcl Army," Economist, v331 n7867 (June 11,1994) 29 
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acquisition of an ex-Soviet aircraft carrier from Ukraine, Western diplomacy, howL'Ver, has 
been successful in prcventing such a transaction, In addition to militmy sales, there are 
presenUy about 1,000 Russian militaJy technicians working in China to help enhance its rocket 
and nuclear technology,13 Although Chinese scientists have exhibited the ability to enhance 
existing technology, they have been unsuccessful in obtaining or discovering key 
breakthroughs 
With one third of its claimed maritime terr itory being occupied or illegally exploited 
by other countries, China has set out on a naval buildup to protect its claims These claims 
of course include the oil rich Spratly T slands, As a result, it has also embarked on a plan to 
convert its huge and ineffective inventory of 1950s and 1 960s aircraft, tanks and patrol boats 
into a smaller, more cohesive and mobile force 
If the rate of economic growth provides the single best indicator of increases for 
subsequent defense expenditures among East Asian countries, then China is expected to 
continue in its militruy purchases of advanced weaponry,'" A consensus exists among western 
nations not to sell advanced weapons to China because it would be destabilizing for the 
regIOn 
11 is not simply China's desire to increase its military capability which makes it a 
potential tlueat in the future, for China continues to carry distrust and antimosity towards 
Japan and other western powers due to past autrocities, Japan is, therefore, perceived as 
threatening and antagonistic towm-ds China as long as it is backed by the United States which 
desires the ultimate downfall of the Communist regime 
'lMikhail llmsov, "Russia is Arming China," Moscow A'ews, n40 (October 7, 
1994) 8 
" Desmond Ball argues this point in "Arms and Affluence," 81-83 
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C. NORTH KOREA (DPRK) 
The Korean peninsula is often described as the "last bastion ofthe Cold War" r he 
C{lufrontation between North and South that continues \0 exist has generally been explained 
by one of two C{lncepts. The siruation is perceived either as a remaining rciie ofthe cold waf 
o r as a long standing and unresolved civil war. Regardless oflhe cause, it endures as the 
most militarized region ofthe world 
Bo\h countries arc sti ll officially in a state of war wi th each other, since only an 
annistice \0 cease hostilities and not a peace treaty re~u l ted from the war in the 1950s With 
Ihis in mind, North Korea sees its ultimate goal being the reunification of the peniIlSula under 
one, "socialist" government. Perceiving military force as simply another option in obtaining 
unification, North Korea has established a nat ional rnilitary strategy centered around 
"communizing" the South 
Since 1962, ;\orth Korea has structured its national strategy around its "Four P oint 
Militat)' Guidelines" With an objective of military suprcmacy over the South, this policy calls 
for the continual enhancement ofits military forces through the four following principles 
1. The whole people will be armcd 
2, The whole country will be forti fi ed 
J. All soldiers will be trained as cadre. Each person will be capable of performing the 
duties of his immediate supervisor 
4 All arms will be modernized. 5~ 
With two thi rds of its 1.2 mi ll ion armed services personnel believed to be staged near the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), it is evident that North Korea takes these principles serious 
With its capital of Seoul, which contains the majority of its population ami industry, 
located in close proximity to the DMZ, South Korea would be expected to be extremely 
ISDe/ense o/Japan 1994 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1994) 37 
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concerned about the balance of military forces . It is generally accepted, however, that South 
Korea's technological edge makes up for the disproportionate numbers show in table (2) 
South Korea feels that it has the abil ity to thwart an offensive by the North without the u~e 
of United States Forces Korea (USFK). The one U.S. infantry division and two air wings arc 
nonetheless encouraged to remain as an additional deterrence or "trip wire" against the North 
should it miscalculate the quality difference. 
North Korea's military strategy for the use of these forces is a unique blending orthe 
PRes "people's war" concept and the defense in depth, attrition strateh')' of the former Soviet 
Union. North Korea has also incorporated experience gained in the Korean War, Vietnam 
and the Middle East in the devising of its clearly offensive strategy. It incorporates 
preemptive or surprise attacks, blitzkrieg maneuvers as well as a mixing of regular and 
irregular waJfare.'(' Recently North Korea has transformed its tank and other mechanized 
divisions into smaller more mobile brigades which can operate more effectively on Korean 
terrain 
Although hampered hy its inferior defense industry, North Korea attempts to 
modernize its anned forces through indigenous production of imitation Soviet T -72 tanks and 
23 nun self-propelled anti-aircraft guns Attempting to compensate for the weak points in its 
military capahility made evident by the results of the Gulf War, North Korea is hoping to 
integrate unconventional warfare (commandos and special forces) with Korean specific teITain 
through the use of tunnels in the carrying out of infiltration and sabotage missions It is 
envisioned that this unconventional watfare will offset the lack of air and naval power 
possessed by North Korea 
l6Dejellse While Paper 1993-1994, (Seoul: Ministry of Nation a! Defense, Republic 
of Korea, 1994) 57 
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North-South Korean Military Comparison 
I 
Patrol ond CoosW Comi>aton" HOJ .. 
Table 2 
Since thl: removal of economic support hom the then Soviet Union, North Korea has 
experience negativc economic growth since 1990. To managl: this problem the DPRK 
initially made efforts to improve relations with the United States and Japan at the end of the 
Cold War. The westcrn community was however experiencing euphoria over the 
reunification ofGennany and was expecting the Korean peninsula shortly to fonow suit. The 
Unitl:d States ddeCled no reason to initiate any actions which would extend the life of the 
DPRK thereby holding up its assimilation into the ROK 
With the discovery that the DPRK was providing Iraq with nuclear and missile 
teclmology prior to the Gulf War, North Korea became labeled a rogue or backlash state by 
the United States increasing its isolation from the West and rl:st of the world. When the issue 
ofintcrnational isolation is coupled with the fd,,1 that North Korea's military is technologically 
in.J"e!ior to that of South Korea, it becomes clear that the development of nuclear weapons and 
3 1 
missile delivery systems would become the logical strategic policy choice 
With its conventional military threat assessed, North Korea's potential nuclear threat 
has brought the DPRK into the international limelight in 1994 As Ch.ina and Russia both 
were turning to the west, North Korea found itself alone and in need ofa deterrent to match 
South Korea's alliance with the United State~, With the economic dilemma taking its toll, it 
perceived the possession of nuclear weapons as the easiest solution to its problems It would 
supply a deterrent force against South Korea and replace the nuelear umbrella of Russia and 
China through indigenous development. Although the DPRK presently possesses chemical 
and biological technology and most likely weapons, it further sought to attain nuclear 
weapons 
In October 1994, international attention was placed upon North Korea's nuclear 
program when an agreement with the United States was made which subsequently freezes 
North Korea's program, in exchange for money, new facilities and resources (i.e. petroleum). 
The payment which exceeds $4 billion will be paid by the ROK and Japan in addition to the 
United States. A bigger prize anticipated by North Korea is that continued discussions will 
hopefully lead to a nonnalization of relations with the United States and therefore ending its 
isolation from the west, 17 
in conjunction with its nuclear program, the DI'RK has aggressively pursued a balli~tic 
missile development program since the early 1980s. Using the technology obtained through 
the purchase ofDF-6 Js from China and Soviet Scud-Bs from Egypt, North Korea began 
indigenously producing Scuds in 1981 . Figure (5) illustrates the subsequent progression to 
the development and production of the No-dong 1 missile in 1993 , This 1000 km range 
missile ha~ thc ability to not only reach Tokyo bllt Beijing and Taipei also. Similar to China, 
North Korea has shown the ability to enhance existing teclrnology, such as in the case of the 
l7"North Korea Takes the Money," Economist, v334 n7897, (14 January 1995) 36 
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development of the Nodong 1.'1 The estimated ranges for the follow on Taep'o-dong 1 and 
2, shown in figure (6), will give North Korea the ability to influence evcnb external to the 
Korean peninsula 
Sales of missiles have been used to bobter further development of the overall 
program. North Korean sales have been primarily litnited to other "rogue" states which have 
been shunned by the United States amVor Soviet Union such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. The CIA 
estimates that at the present rate of advancement, North Korea will develop a missile that can 
reach the contineatalUn.ited States within 1'j years,ll 
By accommodating the United States and South Korea, the DPRK has focused 
attention away from its hallistic missile program. Continue<! production and development will 
eventually lead to instability as the number and accuracy of missiles increase By seeking 
development of nuclear weapons and a viable delivery system, Xorth Korea has gaincd the 
atttention of the West and obtained the upper hand in negotiating reunification with South 
Korea. The DPRK's military modernization programs have led to increased diplomatic 
leverage in its quest for its ultimate goal of unification. 
llWhiJe Western isolation and economic sanctions Illay have increased the expense 
of a DPRK missile industlY, it by no means prevcnted its existence 
,9"North Korea's Ballistic Mjssile Program," North Korea __ A Pmential Time 
Bomb, (Surrey: Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report Xo .2, 1994) 15 
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DPRK Ballistic Missile Development 
Figure 5 




The NOitheast Asian countries of Russia, China and North Korea with similar trenus 
in their strategic thinking now 100m as the principle antagonists in the future to the United 
States and Japan in East Asia and the Pacific. They are (1) establishing offensive nulitary 
strategies based on maneuver and (2) acquiring the appropriate military weapon system to 
implement these offensive strategies 
Russia and China have both reassessed their military doctrines to include the concept 
of power projection. North Korea by virtue of its ballistic missile program and virtual nuclear 
program is obtaining weapons which greatly increase its offensive potentiaL Although Russia 
is not procuring offensive weapon systems such as China and North Korea, by virtue of its 
process of reduction, the resulting force will be more mobile than the original larger force 
In the end all three countries are throwing off defensive postures which were a result 
of the U S. containment policy in favor of offensive tactics The problem is that offensive 
tactics u!rually end up becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, as was the case in Europe prior to 
World War 1. Germi:UlY, France, Austria and Russia all had offensive military strategies which 
led their leaders to have a "use it or lose it" mentality concerning their armed forces 
Offensive policies have in the past lead to offensive acts and subsequently "the Great War" 
In contrast, the situation in Northeast Asia may well be proceeding down the path of western 
democracy and non-aggression described in Francis fukayama's "The End of History " 
Fortunately the U. S -Japan relationship provides a stabilizing force which has deterred the 
outbreak ofhostilites and makes for peace and prosperity throughout the entire region 
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TV. REASSESSMENT OF JAPAN'S lliTLRNATlONAL ROLE SINCE THE ENI) 
OF THE COLD WAR 
Since the Berlin wall came crashing down in 1989, the West has been scrambling to 
cash in on its supposed victory over the totalitarian east . The actual ending ofthe Cold War, 
for the most pan, caught the West by surprise and unprepared for the future. FOlmal foreign 
and domestic policies were not pre-established to address the sudden change from the bipolar 
to a multipolar world. As academics spoke of the new security framework and politicians 
rcferred to the new world order, Japan found itself ncar -center stage" of the international 
conununity without a "director" to Sllpply it with cues 
Japan, like tht: United Staks, has found itsdfundt:rgoing ad hoc domestic changes 
due to the overall decrease in international tensions as it struggles to discover a new 
intemational stralegy. Through cost-benefit analysis, Japan must determine the best approach 
to incrcase its world standing 60 As the leading market democracy in Asia, Japan sees only 
shon term threats to itself in the realm of economics and market access. With China being 
its potentially biggest economic adversary as well as means for opportunity, Japan maintains 
a hedging strategy by taking steps to protect itself against China wt[i le also attempting to 
secure greatcr levels of cooperation through financial loans and direct investment. Japan has 
the luxlJry of reassessing its China policy secure in the knowledge that it is closely supported 
by it s US. ally 
Due to its unique geographic position, Japan is not afforded the comfort of being 
t:conomically independent. A lack of resources has forced it to become dt:pendent on 
international trade With this in mind concerted eftorts since the occllpation period have 
transformed Japan into the economic power which exists today 
This chapter will address the domestic and external/actors which have influenced 
6Q Japan"s world standing is dt:fined not only as its economic power, but also its 
ability to influence others through diplomacy. Due to the continued ami-Japanese sentiment 
throughout Asia, Japan has been reluctant in the realm ofintt:mational negotiations 
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Japan as it reassesses its "new" national security strategy The four major events which have 
driven Japan's policics over the last decade have been the ending of the Cold War, the Gulf 
War, the economic recession of the early 1990s and the political scandal which divided the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and caused its faU from power. The effects of these four 
events have had repercussion not only on the Japan Defense Agency (IDA) but throughout 
the political-military spectrum 
A. POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS 
With the ending of the cold war, Japan's importance increased as the international 
system quickly moved from the old bipolar system of alliances to the new mUltipolar system 
ofgrcater economic interdependence, Primarily because of its economic power, second only 
to the United States, Japan possessed the financial and industrial assets to greatly influence 
the world which now perceived its economic assistance as more valuable than the security 
assurances provided by the two \.vaning superpowers, This new leadership role caught Japan 
unprepared as it found itself with greater choices as well as demands for its financial 
investment in foreign countries 
Having been deeply immersed in the bilateral security agreement with the Vnited 
States, Japan tor the most part. had conditioned its international position on critical issues to 
being the same as or parallel to the U_S position_ This is not to say that the Japanese and 
US positions were not similar on most issues, but Japan had seemingly resigned itself to 
waiting for a United States formal statement or policy before publicly taking a stand on a 
critical issue As long as the Soviet Union posed a credible threat, U,S_ security assurances 
were paramount for Japan's continued prosperity. With the supposedly decreased threat, 
Japan found itself in a position to take a more independent role in dictating its foreign policy, 
as the degree ofU_S _ influence subsequently waned. 
The Gulf War n:volutionized Japanese thinking on security and defense, As a large 
portion of the world's nations joined together to punish unlawful aggression, Japan found 
itself isolated with its anti-aggression rhetoric and anti-military policies. The significant 
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danger that was posed against the oil reserves in the Middle East was clearly evident. to Japa n, 
as it fo und ils hands tied concerning this lhreat to its national well-heing. Unlike Germany, 
whom has not b<.-'Cn seeking an increased international role and has been actively engaged in 
a policy of appeasement with its neighbors, Japan has become interested in a more active 
international role for itself 
Only after heavy US . pressure did Japan, which was prepared to once again sit back 
and reap the benefits of the crisis without making any major contribution, donated funds in 
the sum of$13 billion to the multinalional force s."' In order to maintain good relations with 
the United States, Japan sent minesweepers after the hostil ities concludl'tl for what was 
labeled as peaceful purposes, therefore nol violating its Ban on Overseas Dispatch, 6l The 
Gulf War showed Japan lhat econornjc power in the absence of a (;apable rnilitary for(;e and 
a willingness to deploy this force is inadequate for obtaining the recognition as a world 
power. Along with the end ofthe Cold War, the effect of the Gulf War and the recession 
beginning in 1992, the changes in domestic politics have been the greatest influence in the 
debates for a new stralegic policy 
Although lhe recession followed the Gulf War, it was not Ihe 1113 billion spent to 
defray its cost or the foUowing rise in oil pri(;es which caused Japan's economy to reverse its 
direction. Afkr four consecutive years of above average gro\vth from 1986 to 1990, Japan's 
economy began to slow and fall into a recession63 Led fi rst by a financial crash, caused by 
overrated slock and land prices, Japan experienced a significant reduction in its grov.th rale 
in 1992 followed hy an actual shrinkage ofils economy the fo llowing year. 'rhc -0 ,2 growth 
rate in 1993 as shown in figure 7 was Japan's lowest since 1974 following the oil crisis 
6' For comparison, Germany donated $11 hi llion and dispatched five minesweepers 
to the Persian Gulfin 1'larch in addition to sending surface-Io-air lnissiles, eighteen aircraft 
and hundreds of support personnel to Turkey earlier in the cri~is 
62Consensus building within the Diet on this issue was the major reason for the 
delay in the deployment 
63Average annual growth is considered to be three percent 
The recession had caused Japan to take many concened steps in an attempt to reverse 
the trend . The Ministry of fi nance (MoF) dramatically increased fiscal spending in 1992 to 
bolster domestic demand. Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's first major act after his 
election in August 1993 was to push both the MoF and the Bank ofJapan (BoJ) to take 
greater action-'>-l As Japan attempts to stimulate domestic demand through various policies, 
such as a ¥5 trillion cut in personal income taxes in ]994 and the ¥30 trillion in increased 
public-works expenditures. A strong yen internationally along with a continued trade surplus 
have not been enough to initiate suhstantial growth ofJapan's economy 
Economic - Military Comparison 
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Figure 7 
Although officially reported at slightly over 3% in 1994, Japan's true unemployment 
6-\"Japan," Asia 1994 Yearbook (Far East Economic Review, 1994) 145 
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rate is probably closer to 10% bec.1use idle workers are not included in the compilation . The 
estimated growth for 1994 of24 perccnt indicates only a slight reversal in the recession and 
by no mean~ a return to the hubhle economy of the 1980s 
Despite the recession, Japan continued to increase its direct foreign investment 
abroad . Foreseeing eventual domt:stic labor shortages, Japanest: firms continued their 
policies of globalization in order to ~ecure overseas markets with the majority of their foreign 
investments being concentrated in East Asia/Asia-Pacific region 
Along with the end of the Cold War, the effect of the Gulf\Var. and the recession 
heginning in 1992, the changes in domestic politics have been the greatest influence in the 
debates for a new strategic policy_ In 1955 unloJown to the Japanese at the time, a polit ical 
system which would control Japan's government tor decades wa~ born. The Libt:ral 
Democratic Party established almost exclusive control over the government while the Japan 
Socialist Party") maintaining clearly different political views was the opposition party in 
parliament . Over these decades Japan was ruled by the "iron triangle" fanned among the 
goverrunental, bureaucratic and business circles_ This sysh::m wltich concentrated on its own 
self-perpetuation was not concerned with democracy as the Japanese people wert: left out of 
the dccision process 66 This setup allowed for easy consensus building concerning close 
security relations with the United States The ex.istence oran "elitist" bureaucracy in Japan 
recently ha~ come under criticism for their desiring to perpctuate the old ~ystem of alliance 
with big business as the dominant f),jctor in policy making."' Sentiment increased for a more 
respectable role for politicians as well as being more representative of the Japanese people 
""The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was later reorganized into the Socialist Democratic 
Party of Japan (SDP or SOPJ) 
MKazoo Aichi, "Objections to Secretary General Ozawa," Bungei Shun;", January 
1995 (Japanese MaguineReview: American Embassy, Tokyo, February 1995) 19 
6l"Urging 'Bureaucrats' to Stand Up Fulfill Your Real Duty; Do Not Roughshod ovel 
Poli tics, " Nihon Keizai Shimblln, 14 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese P ress, 
American Embassy, Tokyo, 16 March 1995) 7-8 
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On 14 October 1992, Shin Kanemaru, the leader of the Keiseikai or Takeshita faction 
ofthe LOP re~igncd from parliament because of the publicity given 10 his close relationship 
with the Tokyo yakuza.6! Following the earlier disclosed scandals involving leading 
politicians, this was a near fatal blow to the status quo or old regime government. Following 
Kanemaro's departure, the Takeshita faction split over the issue of political reform 
Murayama. who previously obtained the Prime Minister position with Kanemaru's support, 
was given a no confidence vote within a year forced him out of office after failure to institute 
the political reforms promised in his platform 
.Ln conjunction with Miyazawa's defeat, the LOP experienced a major defection \,,'ith 
the formation of two new parties from the disbanded Takeshita faction . They were the 
Shinseito or Japan Renewal Party and the Shinto Sakigake or New Pioneer Party. following 
the 18 July 1992 general elections, these new parties were able to remove the LOP from 
power with the fonnalion o[ a new alternative coalition government. Morihiro Hosokawa of 
the Japan New Party (lNP) was appointed Prime Minister while the real power of the 
Shinseito under khiro Ozawa's leadership secured five key cabinet positions 
This new coalition govenunent propelled Japan into a new era of politics which was 
no longer centered around the "J9SS political ~ctup" dominated by the competition between 
the LOP and lSP coalitions. This major shift in Japanese politics from support of the status 
quo to a commitment to reform itself, entered Japan into a new era of changc6~ 
Abolishing the old multi-seat constituency system, Hosokawa successfully introduced 
proportional representation based on the Gennan electoral system but witnessed his coalition 
6~his political scandal was by no means Japan's first The earl ier Lockheed bribery 
scandal in the ! 9705 and the Recruit bribery case in 1989 had already linked Japan's 
politicians to the illegal practices of payons and influence buying. It was, however, the 
new international environment caused by the ending of the cold war, that allowed for 
greater attention to be placed on domestic politics 
6"Takeshi 
Affairs, (Fall 
"Agenda for the Post-LDP Era," ,Japan Hn'iew of International 
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hegin to splinter a~ hI: moved away from the popular isslIe of political refoon. After coming 
under atwck for panicipation in a corruption scandal, Hosokawa, while continually denying 
involvement, resigned on 8 April 1994 as Prime Minister. }{jght after replacing Hosokawa, 
Japan Renewal Party (JRP) !;o-founder Tsutomu Hata observed the exodus of the SOPJ and 
Sakigakc from his coalition and on 25 June 1994, only 59 days after assuming office Hata was 
issued a vote of no-confidence and forced to resign. This once again sent Japanese politics 
into a spin as its Memhers of Parliament (MPs) attempted to form a functional coalition. 
The result was the "grand coalition" between the LOP and SOPJ ,0 This arrangement 
ill which the SOPJ leader Tomiichi .\1urayama would obtain the position of prime minister and 
the LDP would receive 13 oUi of the 20 key cabinet positions, was condemned by many 
political analysts as a "piece of political opportunism , ,,-,, The real linkage between the LOP 
and the SOP) is their conunon dislike oflchiro Ozawa and his refonnist ideas which have 
threatened the political lives ofbolh panies l1 
The desire to be in power has forced bOlh parties to reverse thei r ba~ic ideological 
di~putes This was clearly evident when Murnyama rescindl:d many old SOP 1 platform issues 
aller rising to power. By 28 September 1994, in response to this government which is more 
interestt!d in power than reforming itself, Ozawa had successfully fonned an alliance among 
the nine non-communist parties not in power in order to challenge the LOP and SDPJ.TJ 
The new group Jatl:r named the Shinshinto or New Frontier Party (NFP) is now the 
1c.-rhe coalition also inchldes the small Sakigake reformist group which broke away 
from Hala's coalition with the SDPJ 
1]"Japan," A~IU 1995 Yearbook, 141 
" Charles Smith, "Strange Bedfellows: Expediem;y Wins Out over Ideology in 
Coajitiolll'oJitics" Far Eastern Economic Revj{:w (14 July 1994) 22-23 
730zawa has been arguing for years that Japan needs a Westem. style two-party 
system as a means of hanishing factionalism and introducing "real debate" into politics 
Source: Charles Smith, "Honeymoon's End: Prime Minister Murayama Suddenly Looks 
Vulnerable," Far Eastern Economic Re view (13 Octoher 1994) 28-29 
second largest group in Parliament, behind the LDP. Although organized by Ozawa, the 
Shinshinto does stand behind all of his policies and has been argued to have been formed due 
to Japan's new political funding legislation in which larger parties fare better than smaller 
ones. For trus reason the NFP is perceived as a "warmed.up version of old political groupings 
- not a new party offering fresh policies. ,,7. The NFP has therefore been predicted to dissolve 
once political differences of opinion cause rifts in the party 
Meanwhile, a poll conducted in March 1995 indicated that supp0l1 for the present 
cabinet fell to only twenty-seven percent. This is the lowest approval rating for a government 
since fall ofLDP in 1992_71 As political issues arc ignored in formation of pol itical alliances 
and parties, popularity for the present coalition and support of any political party continues 
to de~rease. Japan's political future is, therefore, anything but stahle and cel1ain 
B. EFFF.CTS ON SECURITY POLICIES 
In order to evaluate propt..'fly the impact of these four factors on Japan's reassessment 
of its national security strategy, a clear comprehension of Japan's Cold War defense posture 
is necessary in order to establish a starting point. 
For the past half century, Japan's defense was centered around a reliance on the 
nuclear and conventional deterrence supplied by the United States The blueprint for Japan's 
defense poSnlfC during the Cold War, the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) 
was based on three major assumptions; first , major military clashes between East and West 
could be deterred by a balance of power, including the nuclear powers; second, there could 
be limited anned conflict in the vicinity of Japan; third, lIny major military attack on Japan is 
1·Charles Smith., "Problem Child: Doubts Cloud Birth of New Opposition Grouping," 
Far Eas/ern Economic Review 22 December 1994) 16 
" "'Non-Support' for Murayama Cabinet reaches 34 percent; First reversal of'Support' 
at 27 percent, 'No Leadership any political party'; Results of fvlainichi Public Survey,"' 
Mainichi Shimbull, 15 March 1995 (Daily Sununary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, 
Tokyo, 17 March 1995) 4-6 
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unlikely so long as the US -Japan security arrangement remains functionaL7• The first 
assumption has been made invalid by the e.xit of the Soviet Union as a superpower from the 
international system, while the likelihood of the latter two has decreased significantly 
In conjunction with stating the importance of the security arrangement with the 
Lnited States, the N1)I:'O established force levels along with the general mission goals for the 
n)A 17 The JDA was to be able to defend the Japanese home islands against a small scale 
invasion force, while U.S . forces would concentrale on fi ghting the brunt of the Soviet Far 
East forces thereby indirectly defending Japan by occupying or tying down lhe greatest threat 
This concept was the driving rationale behind Japan's force structure and tnil itary buildup of 
the late 1970sand 1980s 
Although not explicitly stated in its Defense Program Outline, Japan remained 
committed to maintaining a purely defensive posture during the Cold War by not procuring 
weapon systems that would be used in the offensive role of power projection. The NDPO 
was therefore established for extemal as well as intemal consumption by making Japan appear 
unthreatcning to its Asian neighbors while also appeasing the United States lhrough greater 
defense spending and burdensharing. Japan's military acquisitions have clearly steered away 
offensive weapons such as 1) Weapons of "Mass Destruction", 2) Long-Range Bombers, 3) 
Long-Range Ballisti(; :Missiles, and 4) "Offensive" Aircraft Carriers7 ' 
In the mid-1980s, many academics and politicians became concerned with Japan's 
supposed mi li tary buildup. These assessments were primarily based on a (;Qmpanson of 
76Miehael D. Bellows, Asia In TlIC 21st eel/lllry: Evolvmg Strategic Priorities 
(Washington: National Defense Unjversity Press, 1994) 68 
77 A copy of the force levels is included in the appendix 
'i The word offensive in front of aircraft carriers may lead to confusion since US 
style aircraft carriers generally cmphasi7_e the mission of 'power projection.' It is believed 
that the discussions w ncerning ofTensive verses defensive aircraft carriers in Japanese 
defense think tanks are centered around future designs which would concentrate on 
extending Japan's fighte r engagement range in defense of the bome islands 
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rnilitary expenditures between Japan and other nations, Due to Japan's militarist tendencies 
in the first half of this century, many Asian countries quickly became alarmed by the increases 
in Japan's defense spending. Fears over the reemergence of a militarist Japan were, however, 
more psychological than substance 
Although Japan had large defense expenditures, these expenditures do not directly 
correlate to the military procurement in other countries, due to its policy restrictions which 
contribute to Japan's procurement costs being greatly inflated, Japan's high labor costs and 
desire for only ~1ate-of-the-an equipment arc also contributing factors in the distortion of this 
companson 
The tinal section or the NTIPQ states that "attention should also be given to the 
possihility for adequate domestic production of the equipment in question," Over the years 
this statement has translated into approximately 80% of all Japanese military weapons and 
equipment being produced domestically. When this is coupled with the Ban on Anns 
Exports, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) is forced to purchase military equipment at prices 
two to three times higher than that available from foreign producers. This is simply due to 
the fact that Japan's defense industry cannot enjoin the same economies-or-scale with the 
small demand offered only by the JOAN 
Upon closer examination of Japan's military capability in the absence of U,S 
a~sistance, the lOA would have to greatly expand the SDF in order to be threatening to any 
other nation. The G-round Self Defense force (GSDn is too small and does not possess the 
sea lift capability to project itself past its own coastline. 11 is no secret that the Maritime Self 
Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) procure state-of-the-art 
equipment for their forces Because the relatively small ASDF possesses primarily fighters 
and surveillance aircraft, it docs not have the ability to project power either. 'o The MSDF is, 
'9Thomas L Wilborn, Japan's Self-Defense Forces: Whal Dangers 10 Northeast 
Asta? (Carlisle' Strategic Studies Institute, 1994) 14-16 
' ODejense oj Japan 1992, 209 
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of course, the exception to this trend with ig size and caliber of ships making it larger then 
all other East Asian navies with the exception of Russia and China. The MSDF destroyers 
are primarily designed for Anti-Submarine Warfare and Sea Control missions. WithoU! 
proper land-based air cover, however, they would bej<.-opardized if they attempted to stray 
far away from the home islands Wilh a limited anununition supply, Japan also lacks the 
logistical infrastructure to support a major op!;;ration for mor!;; than a week, to say nothing of 
resupplying its forces deployed away fro m its own shores. It is easy to see that Japan's 
present milita1Y force poses no credible threat to the Asian conununity In fact, its mi li tary 
may be too small to deter hostilities short of an invasion in the ahsenc!;; of the U.S security 
agreement 
Having establi shed Japan's Cold War Defense posture, the specific effects which th!;; 
end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, the recession and chang!;; in domestic politics have had 
on Japan's perception ofils in ternat ional role will now be explored . As the Soviet Union's 
power steadily dct:lined throughout Gorbachev's tenure, Japan attempted to reap th!;; b!;;nefits 
of the new world order. thereby enhancing its global rolc 
The litmus test for Japan's resolve in playing a larger international role came quickly 
as Traqi troops crossed the horder into Kuwait. The ruling LDP government quickly put 
together a United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill, which would have allowed for the 
deployment ofth!;; SDF to Ihe Gulf with the other multinational forces. This bill which was 
in tended on overturning Japan's longstanding Ban on Overseas deployment, lacked the 
n<.'Cessary support in the Upper House and therefore became shelved by the LDP in the Diet 
for nearly two years.!1 
On 19 December 1990 in the shadow of the Gulf Crisis, Japan released the Basic 
Policy on Defense Planning in and aft.er FY 1991. This document while marking tlu: 
Iiniet opposition also caused Prime \1inisler Kaifu to halt a plan for seuding 
ASDF C-130~ to ferry refugees from Jordan to Egypt inunediatcly following Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait. Source John E. Endicott, "Japan," The Defense Policies of Nations ' 
A Comparative Shldy, (Baltimore J01m Hopkins, 1994) 352 
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relaxation of tensions belween East and West, reiterated the importance of the security 
agreement with the United States and the continued commitment to upgrading its forces 
Released on thc following day, the .Mid-Term Dcfense Program (FY 1991-1995) called for 
a modest increase in military hardware basically to fill in the gaps and make the SDF a better 
all around force, In addition the Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that Japan would gradually 
increase its cost bearing burden for basic wages and utilities for the employees of the lJ. S 
forces stationed in Japan until it wmes to ddJ-ay all the expenditures in FY1997. At the same 
time the JDA was in tended on playing an active role in shaping the new world order, Prime 
Minister Toshiki Kaifu decided to limit annual incrcm;cs in defense spending to less than three 
pCf(;Cnt in addit ion to initiating a planned review within three years to address further defense 
budget cuts~2 This policy move exemplifies the friction existing between agencies in the 
government as each wntinue to envision a different role for Japan in the future international 
systern 
With the Gulf War amplifying Japan's reluctance and inabil ity to contribute militarily 
to the international community, in June 1992 Japan finally passed legislation allowing the SDF 
to participate in u nited Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in an attempt to reverse this 
negative image " When the recession hit Japan, it was ohvious that new thinking was in order 
for Japan's security due to the increase in fiscal constraints. By December 1992 with Japan 
feeling the full effect of the recession, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa cut ¥580 billion ($5,g 
billion) from the proposed defense budget giving the IDA less than a two percent annual 
increase. The savings were to occur by following the Security Council's revision oflhe Mid-
!2Barbara Wanner, "Japan Explores Restmcturing its Self-Defense Capabilities," 
Japan Economic Instilule Report (Washington: Japan Economic Institute [JEll 38A, 7 
October 1994) J . 
iYrhe "Law Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
and Other Operations" and the "Law to Amend Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of 
Japan Disaster Relief Team" provide the framework Japan's deployment of troop~ to 
Cambodia in Septcmber 1992. Source: Defense of Japan 1994, 117 
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l'erm Defense Program (FY 1991-1995) which called for sizeable reductions in equipmellt 
procurement 
Early in 1994 Prime Minister Hosokawa established a special advisory panel to 
deliberate Oil restructuring the NDPO into a more current document. The result , The 
Modality of the Security and Defense Capahility of JapWl: 'l11e OUI/()()k for the 21 s/ Century, 
was presented to Prime Minister Murayama on 12 August 1994. The new comprehensive 
~eclJrity strategy recommended rested upon three major pillars: multilateral cooperation, 
alliance ",v ith the United States, and a modern and efficient military.i4 Although Murayama 
eventually relaxed the long standing anti-military agenda of the SDP, he was not eager to 
embrace this analysis which was originated by the preceding government 
On 30 August 1994, the SDP released the draft of its new security policy, 'Challenge 
for Peace'. This document called for a basic restructuring and downsizing of the SDF over 
the next 10 years. Having a long anti-military history, the SDP planned across thl: board cuts 
which would affect all factions o f the SDF The 'limited defense' concept stated that Japan 
will "not have weapons and equipment (capable of) attacking othl;:r countries and not use its 
mi litary capabilities outside its sovereign territory." The proposal a lso calls for a restructuring 
of the US -Japan Security Agreement in which Japan would obtain a larger role and U.S 
forces in Japan would decrease. Il The conclusion of this policy measure, however, rests with 
the SDP maintaining its power in the government, an event which is questionabk at best 
Co SUMI\1ARY 
Nthough Japan's defense budget has been increasing since 1975, it has been increasing 
at a somewhat slower rate. Seeing its smallest increase in 34 years (0.9%) in 1994, Japan's 
!~Patriek M. Cronin and !vlichae1 J. Green, Redefining the Us.-Japan Alliance: 
(Washington Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
i'Kensuke Ebata "Draft Proposal Edges Japan Toward Pacifism,' ,}rme 's De/ense 
Weekly, v22 nlO (10 September 1994) 3 
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defense budget has been following a general decreasing trend similar to that in the United 
States a.> the military is put to the test of supplying justification for Cold War funding levels 
ill the less threatening post-Cold War world. With the previously anti-military, Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) coming to power in 1994, a call to hold military expenditures to an 
amlUai increase of 0.9% has been initiated. The Defense Minister's counter af!:,'llment stated 
that a 2,&% increase was required to finance the projected¥I30 billion required in the 1991 
burden-sharing agreement with the United States for its forces deployed in Japan,' · With 
Japan still feeling the effects of the recession, a reversal in defense funding to transform the 
SDF into the modem and mobile force described in the Modality oj the Security and Dejellse 
Capability of.lapan is not plausible in the near tenn 
The ending of the Cold War, the recession, and removal orthe LOP from sole control 
or the government llave all assisted in decreasing Japan's military budget ITom expected or 
predicted levels. With their being a dome~tic call for an increase in Japan's global role, the 
Japanese government, like many others, is placed in a catch twenty-two position. In order 
to playa larger role Japan would, in addition to reversing more of its ant i-military policies, 
be required to increase its military capability greatly at the expense of fiscal budget 
constraints. If Japan wishes to ohtain the true status ora world power, it must be prepared 
to accept the necessary social and fiscal costs foe unilateral rearmament, Bases on the present 
mood, it is not cenain that the Japanese nation is willing to undertake such a conunitment 
A more feasible course, which appears to be direction it is presently heading, is where 
Japan would build a force which is designed to participate in United Nations (U.N.) 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Through PKO similar to those in Cambodia and Rwanda, 
Japan can enhance its international reputation in an attempt to reverse its negative image as 
an uninvolved nation placed upon it from the C'JI,llfWar. In its "Law Concenting Cooperation 
for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and other Operations" Japan established five 
16"More on Defense Budget" Kyodo (25 July 1994) in FBlS-EAS-94-142, Daily 
Report 25 July 1994 
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principles fo r its participation in UN PKO are shown in table (3) 
Basic Guidelines for Japan's Participation in Peacekeeping Forces 
(The So~called Five Princililes) 
I Agreement on a cease~fire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflict 
11 The parties to the conflict, including the territorial state(s), shalJ have given their 
consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan's participation in the force 
Ill . The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party 
to the conflict 
IV. Should any of the above gllidelinc requirements cease to be satisfied, the 
Government ofJapan may withdraw its contingent 
V Use of Weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the 
personnel's lives, etc 
S[)ur~,- Dcjcnu oj J"p"n 1994, 118 
Table 3 
With the SDF participating in election monitoring in Cambodia and humanitarian 
assistance in GOllla, Rwanda following the establishment of its principles, Japan's has 
demonstrated its commitment to maintaining international stability in other than merely 
financial means. Japan, however, has a long way to go in building international recognition 
for it.s contributions which may still be perceived as simply a token effort Japan wil[ need to 
enhance its peacekeeping and humanitarian capabilities in order to be a reJiahle contributor 
in filturc to UN. operations. It is, therefore, in Japan's self interest to perpetuate the security 
relat ionship with the United States as it restructures its force into one better suited for 
peacekeeping operations. The cominued U S presence will also assist in queUing concerns 
ofa remilitariz.ation in Japan by its neighbors. As long as the imminent threat on thl:l Korean 
penin~llia exists, the utility of the security agreement with the Uniled States, panicularLy the 
deployment of US . troops on Japanese soil, will outweigh the costs 
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V. CURRF.NT U.S. STRATEGY AND PENDING ISSUES 
A new era is upon us. The Cold War is over. The dissolution of the 
Soviet empire has radically transformed the security environment facing the 
United States and our allies, The primary security imperative of the past hall 
century -- containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war--
is gone, We no longer face massive Soviel forces across an East-West divide 
nor Soviet missiles targeted on the United States. Yet there remains a 
complex array of new and old security challenges America must meet as we 
approac h a new century !] 
As the United States seeks to carve its own path and shape the global agenda in the 
post Cold War period, the policies the United States undenakes in the near term will directly 
influence the global t:lwirorunent it faces in the next decade and century, The present global 
situation presents the United States with two main choices as to the direction for itself in the 
international community . One direction is to continue or enhance its world leadership role 
through direct involvement in global and other nation's affairs A plausible strategy for the 
United States in this scenario would be for it to take a greater leadership role in the United 
l\"ations while directly allocating the nccessary resources to eacb international issue or crisis 
LO support its view The other possible course would be one ofneo-isolationism in which 
U.S foreign policies would more closely resemble those of the post World War T era when 
the United States swayed away trom international involvement and charmelled its resources 
internally on more domestic concerns 
With the extreme choices of being either a benevolent world leader or an isolationi~t 
country having thei r own distinctive costs, the United States has currently chosen a path of 
"Opening paragraph of the White House white paper A National Security SlrlIteKY 
oj Engagement and ElllmgcmCnl. (Washington: U.S . Government Printing Oftice, 
February 1995) 1 
ltast resistance with a policy appropriately named "selective engagement. " ii Since the end 
of the Gulf \Var, till: sile and type ofre~ources which the United States has contributed to 
international crises has diminished gradually due primarily to budget constraints and a lack 
of direct national interest Recent budget constraints have been the main catalyst hehind a 
reevaluating of the voluntary constraints erected in the shadows of the East-West 
confrontation 
Attention has therefore been placed on the U.S,-Japan security relationship as the 
United States seeks to modifY this relationsmp in conjunction with its new evolving strategy 
The direction the United States takes in its relationship with Japan will playa key role in 
determining the degree to which America is perceived as a true world ltader or simply as a 
waning superpower in an increasingly mUltipolar world, These ongoing discussions over the 
reevaluation of the US -Japan security relationship will also be critical to US . strategies not 
only in Asia but throughout the world.i9 
The first section of this chapter will address the course of the present national strategy 
and its effects on U.S. influence in Japan amI the East Asian Region. The U.S. National 
Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy and the US. Security Strategy for the East 
Asia-Pacific Region will be used to define the U,S. specific strategy for East Asia and Japan 
The subsequent section will discuss the major issues of the ongoing United States-Japan 
Security Dialogue 
IIWhite House, A National Security Strategy of Engagemelll alld Enlargement, 7 
' 9The July/August 1995 issue of Foreign Affairs offers a point/counter-point 
arg\lmcnt for U.S. engagement in East Asia. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs, Joseph S. Nye Jr. presents a convincing case for deep U.S . engagement in 
Japan and East Asia by presenting five pos~ible strategies for the United States with the 
present "Engagement and Enlargement" being the only logical choice. Academics Chalmers 
Johnson and E.n. Keehn interpret the post Cold War world with a greater emphasis on 
economic versus military power. They believe the United State~ docs not have the economic 
resources to compete with A~ia while still providing the region with free defense and security 
and therefore sugge~t disengagement and isolationism. Source: "The U.s. in East Asia: Stay 
or Go?' Two Views on Security " Foreign Affairs v74 n4 (July/August 1995) 90-117 
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A. u.s. STR<\TEGY FOR EAST ASIA AND JAPAN 
For four decades the United States maintained a consistent strategy focused around 
the containment of communism. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and subsequent 
elimination of any credible global threat, the U.S. govenunent quickly scrambled to generate 
a new strategy based upon the new aligrunent ofthe international system. However, the post 
Cold Will era has thus far only presented the United States with the adversary of uncertainty 
as there exists no clear consensus on the fhture direction of the international system and 
world. Many nations ]lerceiving decreasing external threats, have turned greater attention 
towards domestic matters, thereby causing the need or desire lor U.S . assistance and 
intervention to decrease mrukedly_ The absence ofthe Cold War's East-West competition for 
allies has subsequently eroded U.S , influence throughout the world 9(1 With this in mind the 
United States has initiated a National Security Strategy focused on forming an international 
systctn which ",ill continue to be benevolent towards U.S . national interests and prosperity,91 
The present strategy of Engagement and Enlargement articulated by the White House 
sets three main objectives to assist in creating the desired envirorunent conducive to 
supporting our national interests , These objective are: (1) the enhancement of security, (2) 
the promotion of prosperity domestically and (3) the promotion of democracy 
internationallyn Without direct or immediate threats to its sovereignty, and the increasing 
'><lAlthough some ex-Soviet Bloc nations openly ask for U.S assistance, it is only 
financial aid which is truly desired 
91The "enduring national interest" which the National Security Strategy refers to is 
simply the extension of our morales or value system to a greater leveL Using a realist 
perspective of the world, Americans feel that the same rights which apply to individuals 
within our natiOIl, apply to our country within the international system or world. Americans 
feel that their country has the inllerent right or freedom to act or conduct its affairs in any 
manner as long as it doe~ not infringe on the rights of another nation 
92The third goal, the promotion of democracy internationally, was only recently 
added to the national strategy by the Clinton Administration and is more rhetoric than 
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domestic concerns over budget deticits, the United States no longer has unlimited 
discretionary fimds to allot to foreign aid for the purpose of enhancing its influence and world 
security As budgetary responsibility has taken hold in the I 990s, the foreign aid and military 
budgets have decreased due to continually scrutinizing by Congress 
In hopes that self-imposcd reduction~ would prevent even deeper cuts from outside 
agencies, the Depanment of Defense (DOD) has implemented the Boltom up Review, 
Downsizing and then Right-sizing policies initiatives. The resulting military force has been 
reduced to such a level that it (;an no longer maintain the overseas presence levels it once 
enjoyed during the Cold War. With the United State~ being unable to be financially and 
militarily engaged throughout the world, the opportunity for the United States to be able to 
play an intricate role in the structuring ofthe "new world order" may have past. TIllS concern 
has resulted in the present political buzzv,wd of "selective engagement" when it comes to the 
detennination and implementation of foreign policy. No longer having sufficient resources 
to be directly involved in every key event throughout the world, the United States has 
resigned itsclfto only having an opinion on many issues, a situation similar to most other 
nations in the world. The United States will now only take action on those issues in which 
its national interests is the greatest. 9) 
Even in the shadow of a downsizing, the Ulllted States still maintains the world's 
preeminent military lorce. It is through the use or threat of use of this preponderant military 
force that the United States attempts to influence other nations throughout the world through 
this poli(;y of selective engagement. By offering security agreements to the world's most 
substance, Throughout its history the United States has continued to "look the other way" 
when critical allies and friends havc had less than democratic forms of government. This 
third goal is based upon thc incorrect assumption that "democracies do not go to war" and 
therefore should be disregarded as a feasible or sane policy for the United States 
93The State Department's policy concerning Bosnia is a clear example of this 
phenomenon. Although the United States has strong opinions concerning policies in Bosnia, 
its the low level of direct national interest wh.ieh plays the largest role in structuring the US 
level and type of involvement in the region 
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industrialized nations, the United States hopes to alleviate internal pressures within those 
countrie~ to unilaterally arm themselves to such a level that they threaten to Undemline 11.S 
global and regional power, This type of policy has successfully worked in the past with Japan 
and Germany as well as most other NATO nations, Through the "collective security" 
agreement of NATO, European countries were able to curb their defense spending whjle 
feeling st!cure about their neighbor's mi litary power. Tlus was oruy pos~iblc, however, under 
the nuclear/security umbrella of the United States which also stood as the central figure 
around which the others rall ied, This umbrella which is now being perceived as 'unnecessary 
and unwanted' by European countries may not have the cohesiveness it once did in holding 
alliances together 
The challenge facing the United States in Asia is clear enough: to 
design a strateb'Y that minimizes tlueats to peace ami security, promotes 
economic and political development, and maxinu7.es opportunities for 
A.l1lerican business to benefit from the region's economic growth9~ 
I. Enhancement of Security 
Although the primary responsibil ity of the US armed forces is to be ready and able 
to fight and \\~n the nation's wars, it is more teasible that the military 1>0111 continue to perform 
the mission of deterrence as it had throughollt the Cold War. It call be argued that the United 
States has not been involved in a large ~cale war since 19459~ The invention of nuclear 
weapons has restricted military warfare to be conducted wi th.i n particlilar limits throughout 
9~Gerald L Curtis, "Meeting the Challenge of Japan in Asia," Ine United States, 
Japan, and A~'i(j (New York: Norton, 1994) 232 
9'The military operations in Korea, Vietnam and the Pcrsian Gulfover the past half 
l:cntury, all occurred without a declaration of war by thc U.S. Congress, It can, therefore, 
be argued that these actions were an intermediate level military commitment betwcen 
deterrence and general war, due to the ceasing of hostilities without a definitive victor and 
the elimination of the declared enemy 
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the second hal fof this century. It is therefore surmised that future conflicts will continue to 
be ofa limited military nature 
The National Military Strategy published by the Department of Defense (DOD) calls 
for flexible and selective engagement of military forces in pursuit of national polit ical aims 
By focusing the implementation of military force to key nodes and/or times, direct FS 
involvement in any given situation can be minimized thereby reducing overall casualties and 
commitment. This is based upon the belief that democracies (i.e. the United States) in 
conflicts short of total war, become less willing to make the necessary sacrifices to conduct 
military operations, the long!;:r and man: costly these operations become 
By maintaining a technologically advanced and highly trained military force, DOD 
believes that it can di"iate the conditions under which U.S forces will be involved. The key 
difference between the U.S and other country's military forces in conducting operations is 
in the realm of deployment away from the motherland. Although maintaining the world's 
largest air and sea capability. th!;: United States anned forces fear that overseas deployment 
and bases will continue to shrink from their Cold War levels to a point at which our degree 
of influence wi ll be severely hampered 
Based on a be1id'that aggression is deterred and that strategic interests aTe enhanced 
by the overseas presence of military forces, the United States has continually sought to deploy 
its military forces abroad in peacetime and engage in as many bilateral and multilateral 
exercises as possible. Overseas basing of troops a material is not only seen as a torce 
multiplier in crisis reaction time but as a necessity for keeping torce requirements and costs 
at a minimum Since the United States h~ maintained bases or coaling stations in the Pacific 
~nce the end of the Spanish-American War, the military has grown accustom to the enJlanced 
deployment and force projection which these bases provide. This explains the quick 
expansion offacilities in Singapore upon the closing of Clark Air f'orce Base and Subic Bay 
Naval Base in the Philippines 
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With the United States seeing it~clfas the supplier of oxygen (security) to East Asia, % 
i[ strongly desires to conti nue the ability to deploy military forces in the region in order to 
provide a credible stabilizing presence Tlus overseas presence is not only seen as a 
commitment to allies and friends but also as a deterrence against aggression and an 
advancement of US interests Joseph S Nye Jr. stated 
Our security strategy for Asia rests on three pillars our al liances, in 
particular with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Austral ia, forward 
mil itary presence, and our participation in multilateral 
In the absence of any present threat, the White House is interested in maintaining good 
se{:urity relations with Japan a~ it attempts to stave off the emergence of any regional powers 
in the Pacific Rim which may threaten America's level of influence in the regionn The 
present treaties and security agreements wi th Japan offers the greatest utility within the 
enhancement of securi ty pillar of the National Security Strategy, due to the geograpluc 
location of Japan and the level of host nation support for our military forces in the region 
US.-Japan relations have primarily been focused on secu rity in the past, yet with our 
three-pronged strategy greatly intertwined throughout East Asia and the Pacifi(; region, u .S 
relations with Japan play an intri(;ate role across the spectrum of international affairs and are 
96"Securi ty is like oxygen you do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose it 
The American security presence has helped provide tlus 'oxygen' for East Asian 
development." Source Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, 
United Slates Security Strategy for the Easl ASia-Pacific Region, (Wa~hington: U. S 
Govenunent Printing Office, February 1995) I 
9'Joscph S 
Security Alliance, " 
29 March 1995 
Jr , "American Sc(;urity Strategy for E ast Asia and the US-Japan 
given at Pacific Forum CSTS/nIA Conference, San Francisco, 
9!lhis strategy was evident in the U,S. handling of Libya and Iraq in the 1980s and 
1990s respectively 
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not Limited to the issue of security_99 The United States, therefore, seeks to continue its close 
relationship \.vith Japan and all other countries where it has major economic ties that translate 
into vital national interest 
2. Prospel"ity at Homr 
"In thinking about A'>ia, we must remember that security is the first pillar orour new 
Pacific community .. ](10 It is, however, the economic importance of the region which has 
concerned the Clinton administration the most, The strategic importance of this region will 
continue to increase in conjunction with ils economic growth as estimates that the Asia-
Pacific region will become the center of the world economy and production in the 2lst 
century 101 It is strongly suggested that it was the presence and engagement of the U_S 
military in East Asia and the Pacific which has allowed for the "economic miracle" to occur 
in Japan and the four Asian Tigers Over the past decades, with thirty-seven percent of 
America's trade occurring within this region, its continued stability is vital for our own 
prosperity_1D2 
When looking at Asia economically, it is difficult to notice anything that exists outside 
the shadow that Japan has cast over the region. Being second in the world only to the United 
States, Japan is the leading economic power in Asia with many ncighhoring nations linking 
their currencies to the value of the Japanese yen With Japan's level of investment in Asia 
heing more than double that of the United States and margin between the two growing 
""White House, A Nalional Security Strategy ~r Enlargement and Engagemenl, 28 
l<»whitc House, A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement, 28. 
101Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), Stralegic Assessment 1995: u.s. 
Security Challenges in Tran.tition, (Washington: U,S Goverrunent Printing Office, 1995) 
18 
lO~Charles R, Larson, Admiral L;SN, "Pacific Command's Cooperative Engagement: 
Advancing u.s Interests" Military Review v74 n4 (April 1994) 5-0 
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annuaUy, American linns have been concerned that they \vill be "crowded out" of the Pacific 
technology basin" by their Japanese counterparts. ,m When looking at the tconomic potential 
of Chi na, U.S , and Japanese fi rms find themsdves as adversaries in a competition 10 invest 
in this perceived goal mine of the 2 1 st century 
B. UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECllRlTY DiALOGUE 
With recent concerns about Japan being more interested in Asia versus the Uni ted 
States and the West, the Departments of Defense and State have undertaktn an initiative to 
enhance the present relationship with Japan, Al though the United States has allempted to 
pressure Japan concerning the trade imbalance which has existed for de(;ades, the past three 
years have seen a dramatic increase in economic ult imatums from the United States 
government, In order to not have e(;onomic differences jeopardize a security relationship 
which has been in existence for the last half century, the United States has continued to 
"market" the concept that our rdationship with Japan is like a stool with thret kgs, These 
three legs, being our security allian(;e, polit ical cooperation, and economics and trade, are 
distinctively separate and equal. 
With the United States possessing a prepondl;;rance of military power, it follows that 
the military factor will have a strong in11uence on economic negotiations. Without adequate 
attention to this fact, DOD is handicapped in trying 10 distan(;e itsdf from e(;onomic issues 
while negotiating securi ty aftairs 
With its orig in in the Assistant Secretary of Defense Oflicl;; ofIn temational Security 
Affairs, a policy initiative was envisioned whi(;h brought together all the ongoing issues in 
the security arena, fly con~olidating all security related issues concerning Japan into one 
single thrust, the United States is attempting to display its commitment to maintaining stability 
in the region and positive security relations with Japan 
lOJErza F. Vogel, "Japan as Number One in Asia" The United Stmes. Japan and 
Asia (New York: Nonon, 1994) 159 
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Originally called the "Nye Initiative" after Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph S 
Nye Jr , the goal of these talks was to reassure Japan that the United States still values the 
alliance.104 To ease the discussions and debates, the U.S.-Japan SecUlity Dialogue was 
separated into the following dist inctive levels of talks: Bilateral, Regional and Global The 
specific issues of the dialogue are addressed in the subsequent sections of this chaptel 
1. Bilateral Issues 
In looking at the security relationship as it stands, neither side desires to rewrite the 
letter of the law and agreement, yet both seek to agree on a new interpretation of the alliance 
which would more closely match post-Cold War conditions The United States has 
wntinually looked towards Japan for it to increase its share of the military burden when 
countering the Soviets throughout the Cold War. With the Cold War behind us, it is, now, 
Japan that seeks to increase its role in this security partner1ihip , The United States sees 
Japan's increased role falling within the bounds ofthe present security agreement. Through 
closer integration of the JSDF and US, Forces in East Asia, the United States envisions a 
joint Japanese-U.S . force providing stability and security in the regionl0~ Through the 
division of labor, Japan would concentrate on the defense of the home islands and sea lanes 
out to 1000 nautical miles while the United States would continue to provide its power 
projection and nuclear deterrence capahility.Hl6 
It is not plausible that Japan, hidden behind paeifist military policies for decades, 
lo.toaniel Williams, "Rebuilding Military Ties to Tokyo; 'Nye initiative' Launched to 
Address Post-Cold War Security Concerns," Washington Post, 19 February 1995, A48, and 
"America, Japan and the Umnentionable," the Ecollomist, v334 n7903 (25 February 1(95) 
33-14 
lO~A similarity can be drawn to France's security relationship with Germany, French 
fears of a rearmed Gemmny are quelled through close integration of both forces within 
NATO 
I06DOD, United Stales SecurIty Strategy for the lias! ASia-Pacific Region, 25 . 
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would exceed such a military conunitment in the near future A dramatic change in the 
Japanese public is first required before its leaders can pursue a larger international role. This 
ta sk which the present and future Japanese politicians must undertake of dramatically 
changing public opinion is by no means a small feat 
The most volatile issues in the bilateral discussions are those centered around reducing 
the footprint made by United States Armed Forces in Japan. As Japanese citizens peer 
through the fences surrounding U.S. facilities, they notice the tremendous amount of living 
space aITorded to the Americans Of the 100,000 U.S. troops com!nitted to East Asia and 
Pacific region, approximately 45,000 are pemlaJlently based in Japan 101 With about seventy-
five percent of all American mi li tary bases in Japan being concentrated on the island of 
Okinawa, most discussions concerning U.S bases usually gravitate to those U.S facilities 
which occupy nearly fifty percent of the small island. In December 1994, Prime Minister 
Murayama stated that the Okinawa base issues "need to be settled in haste, while considcring 
changes in the international situation, and thc Okinawan residents' fcciings."lol Okinawa 
Governor "Masahide Ota dcsires to change Okinawa's dark image of being an island of military 
bases to an image of a cultural prefecture by completely removing all US forces from 
Okmawa1OO While US.-Japan talks continued on the issue of relocating or downsizing the 
US naval facilities at Naha, Governor Ora argued for the complete and unconditional 
removal of US. forces from the facilityllO The ~aha naval port is the primary embark and 
debark location for the U.S Marines based on Okinawa. To completely close these facilities 
l07Department of Oefensc, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim 
(Washington: U S Government Printing Omce, 1992) 23 
OI "Beginrting of a Solution: The Japan-U.S. Sunurllt Agreement on Bases in 
Okinawa," Uyukyll Shimpo, Tokyo, FBIS-EAS-95-010, 17 January 1995, 11 
tOO"Murayama Wants to Scale Down U.S Military," Kyodo, Tokyo, fBIS-EAS-95-
010 17 January 1995,10 
[]" "Okinawa Governor on Relocating Naha Naval Porr, " Okinawa Times, Naha, 
FBIS-EAS-95-017, 24 January 1995, 3 
would significantly hamper the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (3rd MEF) in the 
performance of their mission of deterring the DPRK by the existence of a ready and capable 
amphibious force in the region. U.S. officials, while agreeing that some facilities should be 
rumed over to the Okinawans, believe that Governor ala's extreme and radical demands are 
more politically than logically driven. This assumption is based upon the negative economic 
impact that would result from the complete rcmoval of all U.S . jOrce.~ from the island 
Although consolidation or moving facilities on Okinawa occupy most of the 
discussions ooncerning US bases, they are by no means limited only to the Ryukyu Islands 
In April 1994, the "21 Sl Century Committee" of the LDP drafted a new platform of policies 
concerning a qualitative and quantitative change in the Japan-US. Sewrity Treaty. One 
proposal was for the return of Yokota Air Base which occupies vast land in a suburb of 
Tokyo for civil not military aviation usesHI 
Japanese public concerns over U.S. bases fraluently transcends the .~ingle issue of land 
ownership to also include the operations which are conducted at these facilities. Due to 
domestic complaints of excessive noise paUution over night landing practices at Atsugi Naval 
Air Station located on the Kanto plain near Tokyo, Japan established facilities on Two Jima 
for use by U.S . naval aircraft during training According to the Defense Facilities 
Administration Agency (DFAA), Japan v.i1l pay part of the costs associated with US. carrier-
borne aircraft training on the island of Two Jima. Due to the additional costs incurred in 
conducting this training away from aircraft home base in Atsugi, the United States asked 
Japan to assist in the relocation of personnel and equipment during training operations. The 
DfAA stated that Japan will cover costs related to the following three elements: (1) the 
transport expense for tanker caflying air fuel, (2) the indirect expenses such as for providing 
meals and administering compounds, and (3) the fuel expense for the ASDF C-130 transport 
lll"Japan's Choices -- 50 years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (part 4) 
U.S. forces in Japan (USfJ) Now Standing at Crossroads," Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo 15 
March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo. 24 March 1995) 
8 
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aircraft carrying American military olTicers.ll2 Tllis type of financ ial a~sistance clearly 
indicates the value Japan places on the existence of U.S, forces and the level of contribution 
it is willing to make in order to ensure their continued presence and readiness 
The final issue in U.S,-Japan bilateral discussions focuses on the joint reduction of 
costs for outfitting and maintaining of military forces . In addition to reducing overall costs 
through drawing on lessons leamed from joint appropriations and tra ining of its four major 
services, the United States desired closer integration between DOD and the IDA. Erza 
Vogel, tasked with East Asian affairs at the U S National Intelligence Coull(;il (NIC), an 
advisory board to the Central imelligence Agency (CIA), has cited the "exchange of 
intell igence" as a key element in "redefining the US,-Japan security arrangement" in the 
future III Although the sharing of spy satellite photography is proof of past intelligence 
exchanges, both nations desire closer integration of resources and expertise, The lDA plans 
to reinforce its present intelligence and policy capability by creating two new support 
organizations. It hopes that a "defense-policy bureau" and an "intell igence headquarters" will 
assist in bringing Ihe IDA closer in line with its U,S, and U,K. brethren_II' The mirrOling of 
U, S and Japanese defense agencies is expected to faci litate the sharing of intelligence and 
information between the two nations 
JU "Defense Facilities Administration Agency's Policy Line: To Shoulder the Costs 
of U,S _ Forces' Training, Will Make up Difference in Connection with Relocation of Place 
for Training to Iwo Jima: Argument over Collective Self-Defense Right Likely to Occur," 
Shimbun, 19 April 1995 (Daily Summary of Japane~e Press American Embassy, 
21 April 1995)4 
llJ"Japan's Choices -- 50 year~ after the End of World War 11 : Cold Peace (pan. 3); 
Changing Narnre of Japan- United States Intelligen(;e Exchanges; To 'Bring together as 
One Perceptions of Un~table Elements'; Secrets Also Shared, Focusing on Possible 
Redefinjtion of Security Alliance," Mainichi. 14 March 1995 (Daily Sununary of Japallese 
Press, 23 March 1995) 8 
''''' Self Defense Force (SDF) Emerges fro m the Cradle," Nikkei Business, 31 
October 1994 (Japanese Magazine Review: American Embassy, Tokyo, November 1994) 
9 
The area of arms procurement offers hope for future savings in both nations by 
reaching greater economies of scale in eventual production, Unless considerable headway is 
made in the area oftechnolugy fur technology (TFI) transfers, true savings will be marginal 
at besL U \ After years of controversy over the develupment ufthe fullow-onjet fighter (FSX), 
Japan has been left v.i th a bad t~te in it~ mouth as \0 U, S, sincerity in the technology transfer 
realm, Watching the United States bow out of prod ucti un while still demanding exorhitant 
prices and tight controls for U.S, copyrighted technology, Japan's Defense Industry found 
itsclfin a very undesirable position After spending over bill ion~ of yen on the designing and 
developing of the FS:x, Mitsubishi Hea")' Industries (h1HJ) now has no plans for production 
past test Oights next summer. By not producing the fighter, the technulogy accumulated 
thruugh trial and error will be fur naught.!l6 
rhese setbacks have however not deterred Japan's aviation and defense industries 
The JDA plans to develop a demonstration-mudel aircraft with technology for next-
generation fighter planes, aiming at the year 2008. The model, expecting to have stealth and 
fly-by-Iight cOlllrol technologies, will greatly exceed the present capabilities of the F-Is, the 
JSDF's mainstay fighter plane.1l1 This will hopefully place Japan in a better bargaining 
positiun in future technology transfer negotiations. 
In addition to aviation procurement, the other diftleult area in U.S ,-Japan bilateral 
discussions is the continued exploration into the cunstruction ora Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) system. Having its evolution as part of the U.S, "Star Wars" program, TMD was 
1t1patrick M, Cronin and Michael J Green, Redefining The u.s. -Japan Alliance: 
Tokyo's National Defense Program, (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 
November 1(94) 13 
116"S elfDefense Foret (SDF) Emergts from the Cradle" 8 
117"Next_Generatian Fighter: IDA, Aircraft Manufacturts to Develop Demonstration 
Model ""ith Domtstic Tectmologies, Aiming at 2008; Projecting Follow-un Madd to Replace 
1'-1 5," Nihof/ Keizai, 3 September 1994, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press: American 
Embassy, Tokyu, 3-6 September 1994) 3-4 
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ex pected to shield Japan from bailisti.: missile attacks. U.S. (.,'Xpccted benefits from the 
deployment and development ofT11D would be great due to the funds received from Japan 
for weapon systems and tcclUlology_ Although the introdu1,1ion of the THI\AO (theater high-
altitude area defense) and ERLINT (improved Patriot) missiles were displayed in Japan with 
great res]lonse, the issue of theater missile defense (TMD) remains up in the air. The extent 
to which Japanese manufactures will be allowed to carry out home production undcllicensing 
once initial proto-types are purchased remains an issue of contention between Japanese and 
U. S business and government officials 111 
In addition to the exorbitant cost Lo Japan, which is not in the present financial or 
political position to fund it, TMD has the difficult issue oftecJmology transfer once again 
rearing its ugly head between the two nat ions. For the most part, the bilateral security 
discussions bl;.':[ween the United States and Japan are simple and clear cut until they cross over 
the line into the economic relationship 
2. Regional and Global Issues 
With the security alliance being the "linchpin of United States security policy in Asia," 
Japan is critical to both our region and global strategic objectives. ll, With continued stability 
being a key rallying point for most nations in the Asian Pacific Region, the United States has 
the goals of transparency and enhanced cooperation between the Pacific nat ions_ Although 
a multilateral security ab'Teement may be unattainable goal in this region due to the historical 
inclinations of its nations. an Asian Security Dialogue hctween them can be hclpn.ll in 
alleviating future issues of contention before they hecome serious 
The perception that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will evolve into anything 
lI~"Japall's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War TT- Cold Peace (Part 7) 
Under the Name of TMD : 'The Last Huge Weaponry Sales Battle of This Century'; 
Domestic Trading Houses and Makers Running About," Sunkd, 18 March 1995 (Daily 
Summary of Japanese Press: American Embassy, Tokyo, 29 March 1995) 7-8 
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more than simply a means of diplomatic exchange, is unfounded and incorrect. It docs, 
however, allow for an open exchange on scwrity issues and national intentions which can 
assist in the casing of tensions in the region. In strongly agreeing with the recommendations 
issued in the United Siaies Securily Strategy for Em;t ASia-Pacific Re~>1on, Japan also cxpects 
regional dialogues and exchanges to serve as the base for future multilateral cooperation 
Presently, Japan is promoting mutual visits by cabinet ministers and high-ranking 
officials, to include the JDA Chainnan, in addition to those by working-level oilicials with its 
neighbors_ The JDA is attempting to becomc more deeply cngaged in Asia through the 
promotion of numerous endeavors whieh include: milital)' instructor, student and observer 
exchanges, research exchanges, mutual visits by naval ships and aircraft, and the carl)'ing out 
of joint training for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and humanitarian 
assistance Furthermore, the JDA intends to increase the transparency of its defense policy 
and budget, and will conclude an agreement for the purpose of preventing sea lanes air 
accidents. '2\1 The ongoing debate concerning the current interpretation of the Constitution 
regarding the participation in multilateral rcgional security system as unconstitutional, must 
first be resolved before Japan can reach a greater level of regional involvement Jl1 Since the 
Japan-US . secUlity structure is the backbone of Japan's security, the JDA intends to remain 
in close liaison with the United States concerning the fine-tuning of its dialogue with athel 
In sh.ifting to more global issues, the United States and Japan once again have very 
similar opinions on restricting the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMU). The 
120"Japan to Promote Security Dialogue with Asia: JDA Groping for Stability after 
Cold War: Multilateralism with 'Japan-U.S.' Security Relationship as Axis," Asahi Shimbun, 
10)"',),0, 13 March 1005 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, 14 March 1005) 1 
llI "Japan's Choices -- 50 Years aftcr the End of World War II : Cold Peace (part I) 
IDA Moving toward Reviewing the Current Interpretation of Regarding 'Collective-Self 
Defense Right' as Violation of Constitution; Secret Discussion Underway, Envi~aging a 
Review of Such Interpretation," Mainichi, 12 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese 
Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 18-20 .\larch 1995) 7-8 
vivid and n:maining memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have made Japan one of the leading 
supporters of the Non-Pro liferatio n Treaty (NPT) and Missile Teclmology Control Regime 
(h-ffCR). Recently Japan announced that it will reduce the amount of Jinancial assistance to 
China for fiscal 1995 in order to protest China's recent nuclear test ing. The United States and 
Japan are also in bed together as strong supporters of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWe) 
Discussions arc presently underv,lay to dl'1emUne the best means of establishing export 
controls in order to avoid the proliferation of strategic goods that could eventually be used 
in weapons production. The major issues being discussed are (1) the adjustment of existing 
export oontrol systems, such as the .MTCR, (2) the managemcnt ofthesc systems, and (3) the 
issuing of assistance to deVeloping countries in Asia for improvi ng or establishing export 
controls, l12 
Before anempting to increase its role in the international system, Japan, first, must 
eliminate the inteOlational opinion that it only knows how to conduct "checkbook diplomacy" 
and is willing to employ a "human contribution" to international crises. Althollgh the world's 
largest economic aid donor, Japan has decided to case up on its push for a permanent position 
on the L:nited Nations Security Council (UNSC). ID Understanding that respect must be 
earned and not demanded, Japan desires to increase its participation in United Nations 
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Relief operations, Following the JSDF's first major 
lll"Japan and United States Agree to work together for Weapons Export Control 
1'0 Reinforce Application of Four Restrictions as well as Assisting Asian Countries in their 
Improving or Setting up Exports Control System: Periodic Talks will Stan next Month," 
Nihon Keizai, 13 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press: American Embassy, 
Tokyo, 14 March 1995) 2-3 
"'In a recent spcech to the Diet, Prime Ministcr Murayama has relaxed his rhetoric 
in his quest for a UNSC seat for Japan . Recent debate among !vIPs over the UN's 
competency has hindered Japan in the presenting a united front in support of a pennanent 
seat. Source: "Murayama's Policy Speech Omits UNSC Seat Issue," Asahi Shimhull (21 
Janllal)' 1995) in FllfS-EAS-95-01-1, Daily Report 23 January 1995 
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deployment in ~upport of the V.N Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993, 
it was discovered that the higl!ly professional and capable JSDF is well suited for such 
operations and need only to gain more experience through further deployments. l24 Recently, 
Japan has sent a fact-finding team named the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force Survey 
lvtission to Syria, Jordan and israd to evaluate the feasibility of deploying JSD!' troops to the 
Golan Heights in support ofVnited Nations Peacekeeping operations (PKO), l2l The United 
States maintains a very enthusiastic opinion concerning the involvement of Japan in PKO 
The United States is willing to assist Japan with logistical support in any U.N. PKO it desires 
to undertake , In the realm of humanitarian reliel; the recent earthquake near Kobe clearly 
showed that there is much room for improvement in the coordination of U.S , support to the 
JSDY Although the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) were completely mobilized within 
three hours of the execution order, Japanese officials being reluctant to openly accept outside 
assistance ended up delaying VSFJ aid for two days.rl6 
Regionally and globally, the United States and Japan are very near agreement in all 
diplomatic matters, It is in the realm of military operations in support ofa united front which 
requires fine tuning. The desired integration of US, and Japanese forces will of course occur 
over time as experience in both forces is increased 
1,4Andrew H,N. Kim, "Japan and Peacekeeping Operations," Military Review. v74 n4 
(April 1994) 30-32 
121"Hayakawa Willllead Fact-Finding Mission for PKO on Golan Heights," Niholl 
KClzai, 25 March 1995 (Daily Sununary ofJapanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 3() 
March 1995) 6 
' l6"Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War IT: Cold Peace (Part 4) 
U.S Forces in Japan (USFJ) Now Standing at Crossroads; Smoldering 'Argument Insisting 
on No Need for Japan-U.S. Security Treaty'; USFJ's Public Relations Campaign on Its 
Pre~ence, Citing Quick Response to Earthquake Disaster," Mainichi, 15 March 1995, (Daily 
Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 24 March 1995) 8 
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VI. CON"CLlJSJON 
Before the U.S.-Japan relationship can be redefined for the post Cold War era, a 
consensus of the present direction of the intemational ~ystem mu~t fi rst be reached. With 
opinions ranging from greater global interdependence to anarchy in both security and 
economic outlooks, the United States and Japan are laced with the task of strengthening their 
relationship. This new alliance must be sufficiently flexible to cope with the uncertain future 
In the Lnited States, a "di~liking of Japan, " which was generated by recent upsurges 
of arguments regarding Japan as unfair, has proliferated and overshadowed the bilateral 
security relationship. Recognizing that if trade tensions are left to fester, they can undermine 
the overall relationship Assistant. Secretary of Stale Winston Lord made the following 
remarks. "The Japan-U.S. security relationship has progressed in a healthy and productive 
way in spite of difficulties in the economic area. The WiO countries should not have their trade 
discord affect other positive areas ,,]21 
The United Slates and Japan are planning to deliver a joint statement declaring their 
po~t Cold War bilateral cooperation at their scheduled bilateral summit to follow the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) fOnlm in Osaka in November 1995 
A. A:\-IERICAN PERSPECTIVE 
With the end of the Cold War. the traditional U.S. national strategy of containment 
became obsolete. Being perceived as the victor, thl::l United States began to downsize its 
military as it had following all other major conflicts in this centut)'. By refocusing of national 
agenda fi'om issues of security to ones of economics, the United States sought a ··nI::lW world 
order" in which the growth in capitalist ideas would cause nat ions to become economically 
!l7··u.S: Asia Policy: Powerfilily Pushing Ahead with Security Dialogue; U.S . Aiming 
to Easl::l Tensions with Confidence Building Measures as Leverage: Politico-Economic 
Approach Soml::lwhat Pragmatic; Repairing Relations with China is Key," Tokyo Shimbun, 2] 
July 1995 (Daily Surmnary ofJapanese Press, /\Jnerican Embassy, To kyo, 28 July 1995) 5-6 
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interdependent on each other, The theory of economic MAD (Murually Assured Destruction) 
would cause countries to seek peaceful resolutions to differences, therehy greatly decreasing 
the likelihood of war and conflict throughout the world. This optimistic view of the world. 
of course, had the United States acting as a hcnevolent hegemon, Occurrences in former 
Yugoslavia, Kuwait and North Korea, however, quickJy clouded this euphoric outlook 
'\s the United States continued to turn towards more domestic concerns following the 
lack of success in Somalia and its lack of action in Bosnia, its international reputation became 
that of a waning disinterest.ed superpower. Concerns in Japan quickly arose as to U,S 
resolve for the continuance ofthc ~\.1utual Security and Cooperation Treaty (MSCT) and 
subsequent defense ofJapan As the Department ofDefCnse (DOD) saw a key spoke in its 
securit.y wheel begin to weaken, it initiated actions for its immediate reinforcement The 
C.S -Japan Security Dialogue is attempting to redefine and strengthen the relationship which 
has suffered from neglect 
H. JAPA!\TSE Al\"TI·AMERICAN PERS,PECTIVE 
Throughout the Cold War, the United States continued to pressure Japan to increase 
its military role in support of the strategy of containment, Not desiring to make itsclfa target 
Japan surrounded itself ""ith anti.military policies in order to appear non-threatening to the 
Soviets and olher nations as it appeased the United States through larger financial 
commitments Understanding that Japan was too valuahle in America's eyes to be left 
unprotected, Japanese leaders fclt secure behind the protection of an American shield 
Cpon the ending ofthe Cold War, US, military and security policies towards Japan 
have seemingly reversed their course During the Cold War, the United States pushed for 
Japan to become militarily Slfong so thal it could stand next to the United States as an aUy 
in the Pacific theater. This partnership could be considered similar to that hetween the United 
Slales and the United Kingdom with the Soviet Cnion during World War II, The British and 
American strategy was for the Soviets to absorb casualties on Germany's easlern front 
thereby conserving eventual allied losses on the western front. No longer needing Japan as 
a partner against communism, the United States now desires that Japan not become a military 
power matching economic prowess 
Being that the JSDF is more than capahle of protecting the home islands from 
Invasion, continued gro'l,vth in the JSDF would only threaten US relative power in Asia and 
the world. By desiring the continuance of the MSCT, the United States is attt:mpting to 
weave a web of entangling relationships around Japan in order to inhibit its ability to act 
unilaterally. With this intensive security dialogue taking nearly a year to complete, Joseph S 
Nyc 1r. stated thaI it will take an even longer time to end the relationship which is now heing 
formed m This hints at the fact that closer relations will indirectly extend the one year notice 
required to abolish the MSCT 
Security redefining is perceived simply as theoretical arming against opinions that 
continuation of the MSCT is utulecessary. A U S Government official said, "it is vitally 
important to put Japan on the 'yoke' of security tram now on, as well to block the way to 
Japan's independent defense,,,,2\) The close integration of the JSDf and U.S . forces will only 
increase Japan's reliance on the United States as the JSDf becomes more specialized and 
depcndent 
Arguing that the economic development which has occurred in Japan and Asia was 
the result of decades of stability, the United States seeks to accept credit for this stability by 
linking it to the fonvard presence of its military forces. The United States has \.-'ven gone so 
far as to ask Japan to subsides the deployment and operation oru.s forces in and around 
Japan An Australian Amhassador slated that "jobs seck security, and security promises 
regional stabili ty. In short, the Clinton administration's Asia commitment is to link the U. S 
economy to the growing market of Asia." uo 
''' ''U.S.' Asia Policy: Powerfully Pu~hing Ahcad with Security Dialogue;" 5-6 
l:/9"Japan, U.S. Beginning to 'Redefine' Bilateral SCCUllty Arrangement," Asahi, 3 Jlllle 
1995 (Daily Sununary ofJapanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 10-12 June 1995) 6 
LlO"Japan, US fieginning to 'Redefine' Bilateral Security Arrangement," Asalii, 6 
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By advocating that China has the potential to become a serious threat to stability and 
prosperity in the 21st century, the United States argued that the security agreement must 
continue in order to prevent or contain this threat. China's rapid economic growth has 
increased its importance to the United States as a trading partner and investment target, but 
in a broader sen~e China looms smaller on America's global map than it did during tbe Cold 
War, III China's forces are so large that even modest and essentiaHy defensive changes in thei r 
size or character are likely to appear threatening to its neighbors, Being that China is so far 
behind t he industrial powers technologicaUy and doctrinally that it understandably feels 
compelled to take steps that will be far from 'modest and essentially defensive' in character 
[t is unlikely that any outside power can stop China's slow but steady drive to modernizc.m 
When compared to the United States Japan must he more appeasing and less adversarial 
towards China, thereby not linking itself to the hardline position normally taken by the United 
States 
C. PLAUSffiLE OUTCOME 
This anti-American interpretation ofO .S.-Japan relations is, however, not shared by 
the present ruling coalition. Disarmament is the present symbol of the Murayama 
Administration, \Vhen coupled with the "hollowing out" of Japan's defense power as a result 
of defense spending cuts carried OUI hy the Miyazawa and Hosokawa cabinets, Japan is not 
in the position to ignore U.S desires to redefine the security agreement B J LOP National 
Defense Division ChiefYoshinori Ohno, however, adds, "security redefining is difficult in the 
III Curtis, "Meeting the Challenge of Japan in fuia," 229 
il2Thomas L McNaugher, "U.S, Military forces in East Asia' The Case for 
Long-Term Engagement," 17lc United States, Japan. and As/a, 202 
iJ3"Defense Capability Hollowing Out (part I) Distortions Resulting from Budget 
Retrenchment; No Money for Even Vehides" .;Shortages Reach 40 Percent," Sankei, \4 
December 1994 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyu, 21 December 
1994) II 
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scheme of the present government."lj, 
Even by <IIlticipaling an anti-American perspective in negotia tions, logic leads to the 
same conclusion that Japan will be extremely receptive to U.S goals since the altemative of 
unilall!ral rearmament is not economically fl!asibll! nor politically viable at present. The 
con1nlOn interests that bind Japan alld the United States beyond the Cold War stem from their 
positions of having the world's largest economies and of leading overseas trading nations m 
Japan struggles with the unresolved question of how to become a leader in the 
pre~ervation of world security without dispatching its forces abroad. This struggle leads 
Japanese leaders to continue 10 lean on tbe United States fo r assistance. A break in the 
security relat ionship would serve neither the United States, Japan nor East Asia 
Willing to stand by Japan as it continues to search for its identity in the intl!rnational 
system, the United States, howl!ver, carmot decide for the Japanese people the level and 
degree of Japanese participation. While the L'nited States may pressure Japan 10 take a larger 
rolt: in maintaining stabi lity, it offers only the option of becoming more dosely tied to the 
Uniled Slates. In alllikclihood, the Japanese will continue to sacrifice self reliance to the 
m~(:essity of paying the ever increasing American subsides 
13<"Japan, U.S . Beginning to 'Redefine' Bilateral Security Arrangement," Asahi, 7 
IJ~zra F Vogel, "Japanese-American Relations Aftcr the Cold War," Daeda/lls, v l2 1 
n4 (Fall 1992) 48 
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AI'I'FNDIX A. TREATY Ol"l\1UTUAL COOPEKATION AND SECURITY 
HtTWt:f:N JAPAN AND TilE UNITED STATES 
Thc United States of America and Japan. 
Dcsising to strengthen the bonds of peace and friend~hip traditionally existing between 
theTTl, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual1iberty, and the rule of law, 
Desiring further 10 encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to 
promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries, 
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the united 
Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, 
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
as affirmed in lhe Charter of the United Nations, 
Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international 
peace and security in the far East, 
I-laving resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual coopcration and security, 
Therefore agree as follows 
ARTICLE T 
The Partic~ undertake, as sct forth in the Chart.cr of the United Nations, to settle any 
intemational disputes in which they may be involved by peacefill mcans in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the terri torial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent ""ith the purposes of 
the United Nations 
The Parties will endeavor in concen with other peace-loving countrics to strengthen 
the Unitl.-U Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be 
discharged more effectively 
ARTICLE IT 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peacefi.ll and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better 
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting 
conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their 
intcrnational economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them 
ARTICLE III 
rhe Parties, individuaUy and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous 
and eftCct.ive self:hclp and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to thei r constitutional 
provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack 
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ARTICLE IV 
The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of 
this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international 
peace and security in the Far East is threatened 
ARTICLE VI 
Each Party, recognizes that an anned attack against either Party in the territories 
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
provisions and processes 
Any such anned attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council ofthe United Nations in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 51 oflhe Charter, Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security 
ARTICLE VI 
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of 
international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the 
usc by its land, air and naval forces offacilities and areas in Japan. 
The usc of these facilities and areas as weU as the status of United States armed forces 
in Japan shall be governed hy a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement 
under Artide III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, 
signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may 
be agreed upon 
ARTICLE VII 
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the 
rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the 
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
ARTICLE VIII 
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United Stales of America and Japan in accordance 
.... ith their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which 
the instruments of rat ification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo 
ARTICLE IX 
The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan ~igned at the 




This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United 
States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations 
arrangements as will satidfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in the Japan area 
However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice 
to the other Party of its intention to tenninate the Treaty, in which ease the Treaty shall 
terminate one year after notice has been given 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigner Plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty 
Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally 
authentic, tlris 19th day of JanuaI)" 1960 
For the United States of America 
CHRISTIAN A HERTER 
DOUGLAS \,lACARTHUR 2ND 
J GRAHAM PARSO::"!S 
For Japan 
NOBUSUKE KlSlli 





APPENDIX B. NA TIONA L DEFENSE PROGRAM O UTLINE 
FORCE I EVILS 
Self-Defense Personnel Quota 
GSDF Basic Units 
Units deployed regionally 
MobileO peratiotl Units 
Low-Alti tude Ground -to-Air Missile Uni ts 
MSDF Basic UnitS 
180,000 Men 
12 Divisions 
2 Combined Brtgades 
I Armor Divi sion 
1 Artillety Brigade 
1 Airoorne Brigade 
1 Training Brigade 
1 Helicopter Brigade 
8 Anti·Aircraft Anillety Groups 
Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (Mobile) 4 Escon Flotillas 
.<\nti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional) 10 Divisions 
Submarine Units 6 Divisions 
Mlnesweeping Units 2 Flotillas 
Land-based Anti -subtnarine Aircraft Units 16 Squadrons 
Main Equipment 
Anti-submarine Surface Ships Apx 60 SlUps 
Submarine 16 Submarines 
Combat Aircraft 220 Combat Ai rcraft 
ASDF Basic Units 
Aircraft. Control and Waming Units 
IttterceptorUnlts 
Suppon Fighter Units 
Air Reconnaissance Units 
Air Transpon Units 
Early Warning Units 
High-AJtitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units 
Matn Equipment 
Combat Aircraft 
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